The Evolutionary Paths of Resort Governance: A case study of British Columbia from 1975 to 2015

by
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B.A. (Hons.), University of Toronto, 2012

Project Submitted in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of Master of Resource Management (Planning)

Report No. 665

in the School of Resource and Environmental Management
Faculty of Environment

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SIMON FRASER UNIVERSITY
Spring 2017

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# Approval

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Ethics Statement

The author, whose name appears on the title page of this work, has obtained, for the research described in this work, either:

a. human research ethics approval from the Simon Fraser University Office of Research Ethics

or

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Abstract

Systems of resort governance do not emerge in a vacuum, instead they are the product of forces and the will of individuals. This study examines the emergence and evolution of resort governance systems. Using British Columbia as a case study, the research explores the driving forces which influenced the creation of significant provincial policies and pieces of legislation that comprise the regional resort governance system. Critical moments in the evolution of British Columbia’s resort governance are explored to better understand the impact of these forces and how they were negotiated. Employing a path creation lens, the project illustrates the importance of past decisions and the power of strategically leveraging forces.

Keywords: resort governance; path dependence; path creation; critical junctures
With gratitude to my parents, Katherine, and Nan
Acknowledgements

I am deeply grateful to everyone who generously shared their time and knowledge with me during interviews and correspondence.

Special gratitude to Dr. Peter Williams for agreeing to mentor me before your well-deserved retirement. Your wisdom, humour, encouragement and guidance will be forever appreciated. Thank you for making sure I always had my ‘stick on the ice’.

I am deeply indebted to my committee members—Dr. Alison Gill, and Richard Porges—for their support throughout my academic and professional career. Also, a thank you to Mark Carras for being an excellent Chair for my defence.

Finally, I must express my very profound gratitude to my parents, brother, and wife for providing me with unfailing support and continuous encouragement throughout my years of study. This accomplishment would not have been possible without them. Thank you.
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<tr>
<td>ASRP</td>
<td>All-Season Resort Policy</td>
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<td>BC</td>
<td>British Columbia</td>
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<tr>
<td>CASP</td>
<td>Commercial Alpine Ski Policy</td>
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<td>EPI</td>
<td>Economic Partnership Initiative</td>
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<td>GST</td>
<td>General Sales Tax</td>
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<td>HST</td>
<td>Harmonized Sales Tax</td>
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<td>MRA-Act</td>
<td>Mountain Resort Association-Act</td>
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<td>MRDT</td>
<td>Municipal and Regional District Tax</td>
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<td>MURB</td>
<td>Multi-Use Residential Building</td>
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<td>PST</td>
<td>Provincial Sales Tax</td>
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<td>RMI</td>
<td>Resort Municipality Initiative</td>
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<td>RMOW</td>
<td>Resort Municipality of Whistler</td>
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<td>SFU</td>
<td>Simon Fraser University</td>
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<td>TIDSA</td>
<td>Travel Industry Development Subsidiary Agreement</td>
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"Would you tell me, please, which way I ought to go from here?"

"That depends a good deal on where you want to get to," said the Cat.

"I don't much care where--" said Alice.

"Then it doesn't matter which way you go," said the Cat.

"--so long as I get SOMEWHERE," Alice added as an explanation.

“Oh, you're sure to do that," said the Cat, “if you only walk long enough.”

- Alice in Wonderland, Lewis Carroll
Chapter 1. Introduction

1.1. Research Rationale

The governance of tourism-based communities presents unique challenges that require equally innovative policies to manage them properly. The policies, which are often crafted at the regional level, must operate twofold: they must provide the community with the legislative tools to craft and/or manage a sustainable and competitive tourism product, and they must also be able to facilitate the creation/maintenance of a desirable and livable community for the residents. These concepts are often intertwined in a tourism community: the identity of the community may become a consumable image for tourists; while in-turn the tourism product—the image and experience—can often shape a community's identity. Nevertheless, the relevant policies must satisfy both of these demands. The issue reflects the dichotomous identity of tourism-based communities—they must function as both a tourism product and community simultaneously. The policies need to reflect this dichotomy.

There is a growing body of literature examining destination governance. Gill and Williams (2011) underscore the importance of this research by suggesting that innovative governance policies and practices are required to increase the competitiveness and sustainability of a destination. Tourism governance systems include development, planning, and policy activities; provide means to allocate resources and exercise control and coordination (Bramwell and Lane, 2011); and highlight how government and non-government institutions work together (Bramwell, 2011). A wide range of activities, power structures, agendas, and institutional linkages is associated with governance.

Resort governance systems do not emerge in vacuums—they are influenced by forces and the will of actors. Throughout their lifecycle they experience shocks and stressors; forces are leveraged to enact change or to maintain the status-quo. This research seeks to better understand the relationship between resort governance and these various influences.
1.2. **Research Objectives**

This study builds on a larger resort governance project carried out by the Centre for Tourism Policy and Research at Simon Fraser University. The project sought to understand the mechanisms of change in resort governance structures by examining the specific forces that influenced the inception and evolution of these systems. This research examines the driving forces and mechanisms employed in the development and evolution of a regional system of resort governance. The research uses a case study approach to analyse how British Columbia's (BC) resort governance system emerged and evolved between 1975 to 2015. British Columbia was selected as a study area because of its creation of the innovative Resort Municipality of Whistler Act, and the influence the Act has had on the rest of the province’s resorts. The research focuses on several ‘critical moments’ in the system’s history that helped inform its emergence or evolution.

The primary research question is: How and why do resort governance systems emerge and change over time?

Specifically, the study seeks to address the following questions:

1. What are the critical moments in BC’s resort governance system?

2. What were the mechanisms of emergence and change that influenced these moments?

1.3. **Research Approach**

1.3.1. **Literature Review**

The literature review provided both the context and theoretical foundation for the proceeding research. The chapter is divided into three sections: (1) introducing evolutionary economic geography, (2) providing an overview of path creation theory, and (3) presenting several theoretical models.
1.3.2. Case Study

A case study research design was employed. The case study focused on the system of resort governance in British Columbia between 1975 and 2015. The primary data were collected through 13 ‘active interviews’ with key knowledge holders. These knowledge holders included municipal and provincial government officials, ski/resort policy experts, resort planners, and community organisation members. Secondary data were collected through archival research. The two data sources allowed for a triangulation in the interpretation of the data collected.

1.4. Research Significance

Understanding the emergence and evolution of the resort governance system may provide critical insights in crafting future strategies and policies for such tourism areas. Examining driving forces and mechanisms of change, within their nuanced socio-political context, may also provide a more granular understanding of how change happens. Boschma (2009) states that "instead of copying best practice models or selecting winners, policy should take the history of each region as a starting point" (p.25). Providing a contextualised analysis of resort policy change allows researchers to understand the specific forces and their influence. In addition, it is anticipated that the research findings will contribute to a growing body of literature surrounding evolutionary economic geography focused on resort governance and regional policy.

1.5. Report Structure

The report is organised into six chapters. Chapter Two is a literature review which highlights relevant research on the subject while also introducing the frame of analysis. Chapter Three describes the methods employed in answering the study’s research questions. Chapter Four is the analysis which presents the research findings. The results are presented in a semi-chronological narrative form. Chapter Five contextualises the research findings within the theoretical framework described in the literature review. Finally, Chapter Six summarizes the major findings, presents the study’s conclusion, and suggests areas of future research.
Chapter 2. Literature Review

This chapter discusses two bodies of literature that provide the theoretical foundation for the study. First, relevant aspects of evolutionary economic geography and its three pillars: general Darwinism, complexity theory, and path dependence are identified. Second, key aspects of path creation theory mostly drawing from the work of Garud and Karnøe (2001) are highlighted. Finally, the chapter concludes with presenting three theoretical models that help shape the conceptual framework guiding this study. These are: Gill and Williams’ (2017) model of constraints and catalysts in destination community governance shaping transitions towards sustainability; Sydow, Schreyogg, and Koch’s (2005) evolutionary pathway model; and an adapted version of these models that will be employed in this study.

Historically, tourism destination development has been characterised by complex patterns of expansion and dynamism, stagnation and retrenchment, and some cases renewal and revitalization. Identifying, and understanding the role of various socio-economic, environmental, and political forces in shaping destination development prospects is critical to increasing their long-term endurance and competitiveness. From an academic perspective, Butler’s Tourism Area Life Cycle (TALC) model represents one of the earliest attempts (1980) to characterise and predict the evolution of tourism destinations. Suggesting that destinations follow an asymptotic growth pattern marked by initial rapid growth, and subsequent periods of stabilisation and then either decline or rejuvenation, it remains a cornerstone foundation on which other theoretical lenses have been used to help advance understanding of tourism destination evolution. (e.g. Hovinen, 2002; Russell, 2006; Russell and Faulkner, 2004), resilience theory (Cochrane, 2010), evolutionary economic geography (Ma and Hassink, 2013), and more¹.

In addition, researchers have employed a variety of other frameworks to explore a range of resort destination evolution issues. These include frameworks and models related to: policy mobility/diffusion (Balsiger and Nahrath, 2015; Richard, 2010; Temenos and McCann, 2012) innovation systems (Hjalager, Huijbens, Björk, Nordin, Flagestad

¹ For a comprehensive overview of the use of TALC within academia, see Lagiewski’s 2006 literature review.
and Knútsson, 2008; Svensson, Nordin and Flagestad, 2005), relational economic geography (Agarwal, 2012; Sanz-Ibáñez and Anton Clavé, 2014), network theory (Ness, Aarstad, Haugland, and Grønseth, 2014), chaos theory (Baggio and Sainaghi, 2011; Boukas and Ziakas, 2014; Russell and Faulkner, 1999, 2004) evolutionary economic geography (Brouder, 2014b; Gill and Williams, 2011, 2014; Ma and Hassink, 2013), and more. This research employs a path dependence/creation framework when examining destination development, which is grounded in evolutionary economic geography.

2.1. Evolutionary Economic Geography

Evolutionary economic geography (EEG) seeks to interpret and explain how the economic landscape is transformed over time by focusing on the specific mechanisms of change within the spatial economy (Boschma and Martin, 2010). EEG strives to improve the understanding of the underlying forces of economic change, adaption, and novelty in the spatial organisation of economic production, circulation, exchange, distribution and consumption (Boschma and Martin, 2007). Unlike traditional economic geography, EEG is not concerned with equilibrium or stasis; instead, it is interested in: historically influenced, geographically embedded, long-term processes that cause the economy to transform itself from within over time” (Brouder, 2014a, p.2). The paradigm offers a more comprehensive view of how change occurs within a region. It allows researchers to answer fundamental questions such as: why do some economic areas thrive while others do not? And how does that happen?

EEG is situated within a general evolutionary turn in the social sciences (Martin, 2009). Since the 1980s, researchers have attempted to renew economic geography to reflect the new realities induced by contemporary capitalism and globalisation (Sanz-Ibáñez and Anton Clavé, 2014). Echoing Schumpeter’s seminal question: “why is economics not an evolutionary science?”. Boschma and Frenken (2006) published a paper whose title began: “Why is economic geography not an evolutionary science”? EEG addresses a significant gap in traditional economic geography, the ability to analyse economic landscapes through a historical lens. EEG helps explain uneven geographical development (Boschma and Martin, 2007).

2 In 2016, Brouder, Clavé, Gill, and Ioannides cheekily published a chapter in their book Tourism Destination Evolution titled “Why is tourism not an evolutionary science?”
Tourism studies have embraced EEG and many scholars have analysed tourism destination development through an EEG lens (Brouder and Erikson, 2013; Halkier and Therkelsen, 2013; Ma and Hassink, 2013). Brouder (2014b) suggests that EEG can offer tourism studies two major contributions: (1) from an epistemological perspective, it may develop into a general theory in economic geography, being applicable to specific processes in space and time; and (2) from an applied perspective, it offers a unique frame for exploring the processes of change within the tourism system that can help destination decision makers better reflect community and stakeholder goals.

![Evolutionary Economic Geography](image)

Figure 1: EEG Approaches (adapted from Sanz-Ibáñez and Anton Clavé, 2014, p. 3)

### 2.1.1. Generalised Darwinism

Generalised Darwinism (GD) draws from modern evolutionary biology to explain economic change. Institutions, firms, and individuals compete with one another using different routines in a defined space of competition (selection environment). Those entities with the most ‘fit’ routines will have a competitive advantage within a particular selection environment. Importantly, the routines and the selection environment are dynamic and co-evolving. GD examines the relationship between competition and change.

Brouder and Eriksson (2013) state that GD is frequently used in EEG. However, there have been no studies within tourism academia that have explicitly used it as their primary theoretical lens. Brouder (2014a) suggests that GD would be very useful when
analysing the transfer, selection, and replication of knowledge within the tourism industry. Brouder, Clavé, Gill, and Ioannides (2016) highlight that the presence of co-evolution in many tourism studies suggest that there is scope for researchers to use GD in the future.

2.1.2. Complexity Theory

Complexity thinking resists reductionism, abandoning law-like statements or universal theoretical principles—making it difficult to define. First developed in non-equilibrium thermodynamics and eventually borrowed by economists, complexity thinking in EEG examines the economic landscape as a complex and adaptive system. Complex systems are distinguished by their nonlinear, non-equilibrium, open, self-organizing, and self-replicating properties which operate on multiple scales simultaneously. Researchers generally focus on the processes of emergence, self-organization, and adaption (Sanz-Ibáñez and Anton Clavé, 2014). The theory examines the system itself. Martin and Sunley (2007) state that a complex system’s inherent connectedness, openness, and nonlinearity mean that it has limited functional decomposability—meaning that it cannot be understood through an understanding of its components.

Complexity theory has recently received much attention in tourism studies (Baggio and Sainaghi, 2011; Ma and Hassink, 2013; Farrwell and Twining-Ward, 2004; McDonald, 2009; Milne and Ateljevic, 2001; Russell and Faulkner, 2004; Zahra and Ryan, 2007). Destinations operate at multiple scales, offer a range products/experiences, and are delivered by various institutions, which are guided through complex and interconnected relationships. Complexity theory offers tourism researchers a means of exploring how change occurs through nuanced and complicated relationships within and outside of a tourism system. Despite not being within the primary focus of this study, many of the characteristics of complex and adaptive systems are present in the findings, including self-replication, openness, and emergence.

2.1.3. Path Dependency

The third component of EEG is path dependency. Path dependency attempts to explain the evolution of economic landscapes by analysing the historical context—
‘history matters’. Developed as a critique of neoclassical economics (Sydow, Schreyogg and Koch, 2005), path dependency rejects the notion that markets only adapt and evolve based on economic efficiency (Meyer and Schubert, 2007). Instead, path dependency examines non-repeatable and random characteristics (Martin, 2009). Theoretically, it re-embeds the evolution of the economic landscape within its particular historical context: choices made in the past influence subsequent choices (Brouder, 2014b; Sydow, Schreyogg and Koch, 2005).

Ebbinghaus (2005) distinguishes between two processes of path dependency: a persistent diffusion path and a branching pathway. The persistent diffusion path is similar to a “well-trodden trail”, in which a trail obtains a critical mass of travellers, and becomes increasingly easy to follow instead of forging a new path. The influencing force has changed, but the same trail remains. The model stresses spontaneity and long-term entrenchment. The second process, branching pathway, resembles a juncture where an actor is presented with a ‘fork in the road’ and must make a choice. The decision requires an investment of time and effort. Once the investment is made, there are sunk costs which create disincentives associated with choosing a different pathway. This process examines the interdependence of event sequences.

Within tourism scholarship, path dependency has been an established analytical framework for some time (Brouder, 2014b). Researchers have made promising attempts in linking the concept of path dependency to destination development (Boshma and Martin, 2010; Brouder, Clavé, Gill, and Ioannides, 2016; Hassink, 2005, 2010; Hassink, Klaerding and Marques, 2014; Martin, 2010; Martin and Sunley, 2006; Strambach and Halkier, 2013). Recently, there has been a shift towards focusing on the role of agency within destination development (Gill and Williams, 2011, 2014, 2016; Halkier and Therkelsen, 2013; Ma and Hassink, 2014).

Path dependency is a central component of this study. Specifically, its focus on the influence of historical events and its ability to examine the reinforcing mechanisms that make the evolutionary pathway resilient to change is what make it relevant for this analysis.
2.2. Path Creation

Path creation is built on the theoretical foundation of path dependency. It aims to incorporate the role of agency in shaping evolutionary pathways and simultaneously respond to criticism that path dependency’s over emphasises contingency—non-deliberate or random events; instead path creation is centred on the purposive actions of actors and organisations.

In 2001 Garud and Karnøe published their seminal paper: “Path creation as a process of mindful deviation”:

In path dependence the emergence of novelty is serendipitous. Events that set paths rolling can only be known posthoc. Consequently, the role of agency is relegated to one of entrepreneurs driving forward while watching the rear view mirror. (Garud and Karnøe, 2001, p. 6-7)

Organisational pathways are social constructs: they are only realised through human activities (specifically decision making) and can, therefore, be changed (Sydow, Schreyogg and Koch, 2005). Path creation focuses on the strategic and deliberate action of a reflexive agent (Meyer and Schubert, 2007). It allows actors to move from a passive observer to an agent of change.

Garud and Karnøe (2001) describe the shift from path dependence to path creation as the binding of objects, relevance structures, and time into the evolutionary process—they become strategic variables for actors to employ (Koefoed, 2011). Objects are defined as: “the physical manifestation of human effort” (Garud and Karnøe, 2001, p.8). This also includes human behaviour and organisational routines. An actor’s ability to ‘translate’ these artefacts significantly impacts on the power of the actor. For example, when arguing for policy reform politicians often draw lessons from other policies. Their ability to ‘translate’ these other policies to suit their needs dictates their influence. Relevance structures, similar to the concept of an ‘organizational field’ (Garud and Karnøe, 2001), are a coherent set of practices and/or meanings, which can include regulation, and mutual understanding between actors (Koppers, 2015). Actors work both within and outside of these relevance structures—they often have an intimate knowledge of the field while concurrently ‘looking from the outside in’ and evaluating how much they can deviate from it (Garud and Karnøe, 2001). In this regard, the actor’s ability to span these relevance structures is a powerful tool in the path creation process. Returning to
the previous example of policy reform, a politician’s ability to reframe and expand the boundaries of existing policies and regulatory regimes is a powerful tactic. Finally, actors can endogenize time, “Temporal agency is manifest in the ability of actors to utilise time as a resource in deciding when to act” (Gill and Williams, 2014, p. 4). Beyond when to act, time can be a key resource by evoking a sense of urgency, influencing a strategic vision, or employing the past. For instance, “history, as an interpretation of the past, becomes a key resource which is drawn upon even as it is being made” (Garud and Karnøe, 2001, p. 32).

Organisational pathways do not operate in a vacuum. They evolve and co-evolve with their environment—actors may intentionally deviate from existing objects and relevance structures in anticipation of new futures. This means that an actor may force inefficiencies in the present with the intent of planning for the future. Agency is central to the path creation process. An actor’s ability to translate objects, span relevance structures, and mobilize time as a resource is a key mechanism influencing organisational pathways.

Instead of a post hoc explanation of evolutionary change, path creation focuses on real-time influences—"a phenomena in the making" (Garud and Karnøe, 2001, p. 3). When analysing path creation, the research perspective changes, researchers embed themselves within the system when the decision occurred—being on the inside of the system looking out (Gill and Williams, 2014). The researcher must study the particular entanglements that actors negotiate to better understand their action.

The research benefits from adopting a path creation lens. When analysing past events—critical moments—it can be tempting to consider a sequence of events as being inevitable (Garud and Karnøe 2001). However, resort governance systems do not evolve accidentally, they are deliberate created and shaped. Path creation provides the necessary tools to analyse the mechanisms of change.

2.3. Theoretical Models

2.3.1. Evolution of Resort Governance
Gill and Williams (2014) proposed a model to analyse changes in governance strategies and structures within a resort. The model examines the constraints and catalysts of change by including both path dependency and path creation forces. Importantly, the authors state that their model is not intended to be a process model, but instead understood as a “heuristic device to assist in understanding the complexities of governance change in tourist destinations” (Gill and Williams, 2017, p. 44). Influenced by the work of Garud and Karnøe (2001), Gill and Williams focus on the ability of individual stakeholders to leverage particular forces to mindfully deviate from an existing evolutionary pathway. The model then examines how these pathway mechanisms affect the resort’s governance, placing it on a continuum from pro-growth to sustainable development. The authors have successively refined this model through numerous studies of the Whistler area.

**Figure 2**: A model of constraints and catalysts in destination community governance transition towards sustainability (from Gill and Williams, 2017, p.49)

The model suggests that there are specific lock-in mechanisms that restrict change and promote path dependency. A lock-in is a self-reinforcing process that operates through a series of positive feedbacks within the system. Martin (2009)
emphasises that lock-ins should not infer stability and stagnation (which contradicts the notion of an evolutionary model). Instead lock-ins constrain the available choices compared to those at a previous juncture (Sydow, Schreyogg, and Koch, 2005). Drawing from Grabher (1993), three unique lock-in mechanisms are identified in the Gill and Williams (2017) model: structural, political, and cognitive. These can work independently or complementary to one another. Structural lock-ins focus on functional feedback processes such as sunk costs or transition costs. Cognitive lock-ins relate to institutional embedding (Gill and Williams, 2011). Finally, political lock-in refers to dominant power structures that have a vested interest in the current path and are resistant to change (Schienstock, 2004). The model describes how the agendas, interests, and culture of influential people and structures can often interfere with change.

The Gill and Williams (2017) model also describes the mechanism of change associated with path creation. Specifically, it identifies mechanisms that have the ability to challenge the status-quo, to un-lock existing pathways, and/or facilitate the creation of new ones. The model highlights four forces identified in the literature and reinforced in their investigations. These are agency, real-time influences, exogenous events, and endogenous events. The authors emphasise that entrepreneurial individuals can strategically use these forces to help influence new pathways.

The Gill and Williams (2017) model provides a useful frame of analysis. The incorporation of path dependence, and path creation forces provides a pertinent overview of the mechanisms of change within a resort governance system. Unlike Gill and Williams (2017), this research will not attempt to characterise or typify resort governance systems; it will instead focus on the mechanisms that trigger change.

2.3.2. Evolutionary Pathway Model

Sydow, Schreyogg, and Koch (2009) provide a constructive critique of the relatively ‘loose’ and often ‘metaphorical’ academic applications of path dependency theory. They then propose a cyclical process model that extends perspectives on the evolutionary aspects of the concept. It has three distinct phases: (1) preformation; (2) formation phase; (3) and lock-in. These phases are critical in conveying the fluidity of evolutionary pathways and incorporate the dimension of temporality—which is central to the theory’s unofficial slogan: history matters.
The model (Figure 3) provides a visual representation of a phased organisational evolutionary pathway. It also highlights the effect of this path creation process in the context of a range of available options. As the pathway is formed and journeys through time (on the x-axis) the scope of possible choice narrows (on the y-axis) until it is obliged to operate within a restrictive corridor (path dependence). Phase 1 through 3 describe phases in a successful path creation process that involves exploring and selecting from several available policy options and eventually leads to a specific path dependence course.

![Evolutionary Pathway Model](adapted from Sydow, Schreyogg, and Koch 2009)

2.3.3. Criticism of Mixing Path Dependency and Path Creation

Garud, Kumaraswamy, and Kærnøe (2010) provide a warning about mixing path dependence and path creation, observing that:

Some may like to think that path dependence and path creation are complements of each other and that any process is driven by a mix of the two (e.g. Sydow et al., 2009). To us, this is mixing ontologies. Path dependence has its place – for managers and administrators who may not have the time or wherewithal to fully engage with processes and yet want to seed their emergence or intervene if they perceive that the process has locked into a vicious circle. Path creation also has its place – for involved actors who attempt to shape an unfolding process in real-time, knowing that no one can fully determine the emergent ecology of socio-material entanglements. Accordingly, our commentary is meta-theoretical (p. 769-770).
They argue that the ontological focus changes between path dependence and path creation. Path dependence examines the system from the outside looking in, while path creation positions the researcher within the system looking out.

Sydow, Windeler, Müller-Seitz, and Lange (2012) provide a rebuttal to the criticism stating that:

Instead of “mixing ontologies” (Garud, Kumaraswamy, and Karnøe 2010), this concept offers a constructivist understanding in which path dependence and path creation are only two possible ways to build and transform a path in time and space; others are intentional path defense or extension, unintended path dissolution, or breaking a path without creating a new one (p.158).

The authors argue that their research (Sydow et al., 2009; Sydow et al., 2012) is situated within a broader context of organisational pathways and there are many factors beyond path dependence and path creation.

For this research, it will be critical to revisit the warning provided by Garud et al. (2010). Can these two theories complement one another effectively? Or does it result in convoluted mixing of ontologies?

2.3.4. Adapted Model of Analysis

This 699 study’s research is grounded in path dependency concepts and is primarily drawn from perspectives associated with the models of Sydow, Schreyogg, and Koch (2005) and Gill and Williams (2017). The research is also informed by the theoretical concepts and mechanisms of path creation (Garud and Karnøe 2001). Collectively, the preceding perspectives will be used to guide a case study exploring the evolution of resort governance in British Columbia, Canada (see figure 4).
Stakeholders (actors) rarely make decisions *de novo*; Phase 1 attempts to describe the already limited range of options available. It is the ‘pre-paradigmatic phase’ (Dosi, 1982). The initial phase of path creation is not unbounded. Rather, it is constrained by initial circumstances which include factors such as existing: policy frameworks, resource allocations, previous decisions, and geographic constraints. Sydow, Schreyogg, and Koch (2005) state that the pre-paradigmatic phase requires ‘change-based momentum’ that provides “the energy associated with pursuing a new trajectory” (p. 28). This energy increases until a critical juncture or moment is reached when a decision is made to reduce available options to a more select few. Such junctures are ‘critical’ because they make it significantly more difficult to return to a previous state (Mahoney, 2000).

Phase 2 builds on the initial momentum as options increasingly narrow and a critical mass develops. The ‘critical mass threshold’ occurs when the new pathway becomes easier to use than previous options. The success of this new organisational pathway is strictly dependent on its capacity to reach a ‘critical mass threshold’ (Witt, 1997). Once the threshold has been passed, it moves into the third phase: path dependency.

A series of self-reinforcing feedback mechanisms restrict the available options during phase 3—resulting in path dependency. As described through Gill and Williams’ (2017) model, the lock-in mechanism can be either structural, cognitive, political or a
mixture. Sydow, Schreyogg, and Koch (2005) stress that lock-in mechanisms should not be viewed as unchallengeable natural laws, but represent social constructs that can be interpreted and acted upon in a variety of ways.

The final phase of the Sydow, Schreyogg, and Koch (2005) model is path breaking. In this phase, the path dependent trajectory becomes unlocked through the intervention of other path creation change agents. These actions can lead to path creation; however, they can equally lead to path switching or path cessation—similar to Butler (1980) final phase of decline or rejuvenation to the Tourism Area Life Cycle. The defining characteristic of phase 4 is unlocking the existing path dependent process.
Chapter 3. Methods of Inquiry

3.1. Chapter Introduction

This section describes the methods employed in answering the overarching question: How does a resort governance system emerge and evolve? A case study approach was used to explore the utility of the theoretical frame in an applied context. As suggested by Bromley (1986) two separate methods of inquiry were used to triangulate and ensure the internal validity of the case study findings. These approaches involved active interviews and archival research. The key informant research included a series of active interviews with informants directly involved with helping formulate resort governance policies at various points during the evolution of British Columbia's resort policy framework. The content of these interviews was subsequently examined with respect to their alignment with overriding governance shaping themes identified in existing academic and government literature. The majority of the archival research was completed before the interviews were conducted for two primary reasons: (1) to provide the background information needed to optimize the exploration of key themes and issues with informants (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995), and (2) to help identify and elaborate on ‘critical moments’ central to the evolution of B’C’s resort policy evolution.

3.2. Research Questions and Objectives

The overarching goal of this research is to better understand how and why resort governance systems emerge and change over time.

3.2.1. Primary and Secondary Research Questions

Relating to the research goal, a series of primary and secondary questions were created. These questions were asked within the context and scope of a case study concerning British Columbia’s (BC) evolving resort governance system between 1975 and 2015. They were as follows:

1. What are the critical moments shaping the evolution of BC’s resort governance system?
a. What significant effects did these moments have on BC’s resort governance system?

b. In what broader context did these moments occur in? (e.g. socio-political environment, economic realities, etc.)

c. Who were the key actors and institutions influencing decisions in these moments?

d. During these moments, what (if any) alternative decisions were being discussed?

2. What were the mechanisms of emergence and change that influenced these moments?

   a. What were the forces that influenced the critical moment?

   b. How did key actors and institutions leverage or mitigate these forces?

3.3. Case Study

To understand how the system of resort governance emerged and evolved, a case study research design prominent in much tourism research was employed. (Stoecker, 1991; Xiao and Smith, 2006). Such an approach is particularly useful when examining a phenomenon in its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between the phenomenon and its context are not clearly evident (Yin, 1981a; Yin, 1981b); or when explaining the idiosyncrasies which make up an unexplained variance (Stoecker, 1991). Using archival research to frame the data collection process is regarded as being especially useful in such case-based investigations and can be employed in both a priori and posteriori fashion (Yin, 1981b).

3.3.1. Case Study Selection

For this case study, the evolution of BC’s resort governance system between 1975 and 2015 was chosen as the focus of the research for several reasons.
Firstly, BC’s resorts have a long history of contributing to the growth and economic impact of tourism on the province’s tourism economy. In 2015 the tourism industry contributed approximately $7.4 billion of value added to the BC economy (Destination British Columbia, 2016). An estimated $905 million came from 14 designated resort communities (Resort Municipality Initiative – Resort Collaborative, 2016).

Secondly, the extent of this growth and impact have in no small part been influenced by unique and evolving governance legislation that currently provides 14 designated ‘resort municipalities’ in British Columbia with a variety of governance privileges designed to make these places more enduring and competitive in the global tourism marketplace. The designation of these places as resort municipalities differentiates them from other urban centres in the province which do not depend on tourism as their most dominant source of income. These resort municipalities have an innovative revenue stream from the provincial government—the Resort Municipality Initiative (RMI) allocates approximately $10.5 million per year across all 14 communities. Since the RMI’s inception in 2007, it has provided approximately $108.6 million to these communities.

Finally, the resort governance system legislation that has developed in British Columbia while unique to the province, provides valuable lessons for other regions to consider when seeking to nurture the long-term benefits from resort destination development. Indeed, since the formal inception of Whistler, BC as the province’s first formally designated Resort Municipality in 1975, complete with its distinct governance system, it has continued to be examined by tourism development and management specialists as a novel model of resort governance. The Resort Municipality of Whistler Act—the foundational piece of legislation eventually shaping governance policies in BC’s resorts—initially granted Whistler with unprecedented financial and taxation power and was designed to support and encourage tourism growth (Gill and Williams, 2011). Ironically and despite the important influence of BC’s resort governance policies, the forces shaping the original evolution and subsequent changes to the initial resort legislation have never been fully reported. This case study’s findings contribute to remedying this gap.

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3 This is a contentious issue as there is no definition of which communities are tourism dependent and those who are not.
3.4. Data Collection

The data collection for this case study occurred between April and December of 2015. Primary data were collected through 13 key informant interviews with pertinent municipal and provincial government officers, resort planners, ski/resort policy experts, and members of relevant community organisations. Each informant was selected based on their personal entrenchment in the evolution of the BC resort governance system during specific ‘meaningful events’. Specific supportive and/or elaborative secondary data were collected through archival research derived from official government documents, municipal reports, project proposals, newspaper publications, government websites, and the provincial Hansard (transcriptions of debates within the provincial legislative assembly) published between 1970 to 2015. The coupling of primary data along with secondary data allowed for triangulation, designed to help reduce bias and increase the case study’s overall validity (Cresswell, 2009; Oppermann, 2000).

3.4.1. Interview Strategy: Active Interview

The interview strategy used entailed a series of semi-structured active interviews. Semi-structured interviews can provide interviewers and interviewees with adequate time to explore issues in-depth (Longhurst, 2009). However, it is important to understand that interviewers are not passive actors in such processes. Active interviews involve a joint construction of knowledge (Grindsted, 2005). Holstein and Gubrium (1995) remind us that in active interviews people are not merely vessels that information is drawn from. Instead, they provide a form of social occasion where the interviewer join in the co-construction of knowledge (Marvasti, 2010).

Active interviews are most suited to examining the joint construction of meaning, engaging three dynamic components in the process: the interviewee, the interview experience, and the interviewer: “All …. are inevitably implicated in making meaning” (Gubrium and Holstein, 1995, p. 18). The respondent does not only give facts but transforms facts and details into meanings (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). Interviewees and interviewers continually shape details and facts into something comprehensible while delivering their narratives. Secondly, the nature of being interviewed shapes the way meaning is constructed. The researcher provides an introduction of themselves and their particular research focus—which ultimately guides the respondents towards critical
issues. As such they play a major role in constructing meaning, drawing from a particular source of background information to prompt their respondents towards specific narrative topics which align with the research focus. Through these tactics, active interviews create the circumstances in which: “Meaning-making is a continually unfolding process” (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995, p. 52).

3.4.2. Interview Instrument

Primary data for this research were obtained from a series of 13 active interviews. Each informant was associated with one or more critical moments in the resort governance system’s evolution. Identification of the potential interviews occurred via an iterative process. Initially, some interviewees emerged from the initial archival phase of the research in which critical moments and related informants surfaced. However, additional informants deemed more appropriate or linked to other critical moments also were identified during the active interview phase. This, in turn, led to further archival research and additional interviews.

While a unique emphasis emerged as the focus of each interview, all of the interview instruments retained common themes derived from the literature review. The guiding instrument (see Appendix A) purposely included general opening questions (e.g. background information) at the beginning of the enquiry schedule to help build rapport and trust between the respondent and interviewer as Longhurst (2009) suggested. However, later in the interview process, the survey instrument’s questions acted as more of a guide than a strict script, unfolding in emphasis and probing as the interview unfolded in a conversational manner.

The interview’s schedule of questions remained flexible enough to allow for new questions and discussions to arise throughout the process. As such, the schedule acted as a guide that helped the interviewer steer the conversation with prompts and background information towards the case’s research goals.

3.4.3. Interview Process

All interviews were conducted in neutral settings that ensured the comfort of both the interviewer and his respondents. An introductory email and/or phone call detailed a
brief overview of the study as well as communicated the rules of engagement. Before each interview, a summary of the study was provided, along with a personalised overview of why they were selected to participate and specific areas of focus for their interview. This helped scope the interview, reduce interview time burdens, as well as centre the focus on where the interviewee was an appropriate subject matter expert (concurrently reducing speculation). All participants were asked to sign a form, that had been approved SFU Office of Ethics, consenting to the interview. Once consent was obtained, the interview commenced.

Throughout each interview, the interviewer inserted himself into the conversation to engage with the respondent or to elicit other conversational pieces. This was not only a steering mechanism, but it helped maintain a relaxed atmosphere. At strategic breaks in the subject matter, the interviewer often summarised his interpretations as a verification tool (Grindsted, 2005). The respondent was also encouraged to ask for clarification or elaboration regarding particular questions.

Nearly all of the interviews were audio recorded, and each interviewee provided explicit and written permission for such recording before the questioning process. Interviews ranged from approximately one hour to four hours in length. The interview recordings and notes were then transcribed shortly after. All data was handled in accordance to the Simon Fraser University Research Ethics Guidelines.

3.5. **Data Analysis**

3.5.1. **Secondary (Archival) Data Analysis**

The secondary archival data collection and analysis phase was central to customizing the primary data collection process and interview instrument. As Yin (2003) suggests, this ‘blueprint’ can inform the design logic of the case study. It helped: identify and categorize the relevant and meaningful moments in the province’s resort governance system; select several key actors and institutions who were influential during these moments (these actors were often contacted to become participants), provide background information to help engage with interview respondents. Later it helped validate new information which emerged during the primary research. As such, the
archival data collection was not only pivotal in shaping the direction and focus of the primary research, but also in helping interpret the findings of the primary research.

3.5.2. Primary (Interview) Data Analysis

The main goal of an active interview analytical process is not merely to report what the respondents said but to examine the meaning-making process itself. The active interview provides a methodological framework for studying the respondent's unique perspective or their 'window on the world' (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995). The analysis of the interview reflects this particular epistemological paradigm.

In this study, the interviews were transcribed shortly after the interview took place. Some of the questions in the interview were treated as more 'fact finding' data, which helped populate the developed framework. These data were not further coded. The majority of data was coded in order to help identify themes critical to the investigation. These themes are present in the general narrative of the analysis and further expanded upon in the discussion section.

3.5.3. Case Study Limitations

There are several limitations to case study research. Firstly, the research frame was bound by a series of *a priori* steps (Stoecker, 1991, p. 18). This included the researcher being inextricably involved in the research process because of the active interview approach taken in the investigation. As well, the case study approach employed meant that the findings cannot be generalised to broader contexts (Stoecker, 1991; Yin, 1999). Consequently, the results are constrained by the boundaries of a particular time and space in BC resort governance system evolution.

3.5.4. Sampling Limitations

The sampling process used created several constraints. Firstly, the participants were chosen through a non-probabilistic sampling technique: selective sampling. The preliminary set of participants were identified through archival research. The second round of participants were identified through the primary research. While all respondents were identified as being intimately familiar with 'what went on at the time' there is no way
of ensuring that the perspectives they offered are representative of the full range of views of other potential informants not identified or not available for consultation. As such the findings reported are not necessarily generalizable to a broader context. However, the goal of this research was not to establish representativeness in perspectives, but rather to gain the viewpoints of a select group of informants central to the resort governance system’s evolution.

3.5.5. Active Interview Limitations

There are concerns about the reliability and validity of the active interview technique. Reliability of interviews is focused on replicability—the data generated should be repeatable. However, in the active interview understanding and meaning is co-constructed and specific to that particular setting. If a respondent was asked the same question twice, they might not produce the same answer. An interview is a social event, which can therefore not be duplicated. Typically, validity is concerned with what is the ‘correct' answer to a particular question. This measure cannot be used within an active interview context; the validity instead is derived from the respondent’s “ability to convey situated experiential realities in terms that are locally comprehensible” (Holstein and Gubrium, 1995, p. 9). The validity of the answer is judged by the respondent's capacity to use their knowledge to construct meaningful narratives about their local environment. The active interview examines how the co-construction of knowledge unfolds—it is not an analysis of the knowledge itself. The data generated through the active interview process were corroborated with other interview data and additional archival research.
Chapter 4. Research Context, Findings and Analysis

4.1. Introduction

This chapter describes the research context and presents the results of the case study. It presents the findings in a semi-chronological narrative format, using the theoretical model as a framework. The chapter is divided into four sections which correspond to the model of analysis: (1) generating momentum (path creation); (2) path shaping/developing; (3) path dependence; and (4) path breaking. The analysis examines the relevant forces and mechanisms of change during critical moments of BC’s resort governance system.

4.2. Phase 1: Generating Momentum

Figure 5: Phase 1 of the Resort Governance Evolutionary Pathway

The first phase of the evolutionary pathway concerns generating momentum. Momentum is built through a series of events that influence a single moment—a critical juncture. This moment, or critical juncture, is defined by its reduction of potential pathways. Once passed there are fewer avenues to pursue than before it occurred. For British Columbia (BC), this critical event was the incorporation of the Resort Municipality of Whistler in 1975. Not incorporated in a vacuum, previous events influenced Whistler's
inception. This section examines the pre-paradigmatic phase before the critical juncture from 1960 to 1975. The research identifies five driving forces during this phase: (1) ski development in the United States; (2) conceptualization of recreational resources; (3) Cypress Mountain’s development; (4) the Instant Town Act; and (5) the Silver Book.

4.2.1. Ski Development in the United States

The ski industry in the United States (US) had a significant impact on the BC’s counterpart. Indeed, many policies used by the US Forest Service acted as a template for BC’s policy regime. The BC policy makers unabashedly adopted these policies. Secondly, the downturn of the US ski area development created a gap in the market for BC. Mainly attributed to the emergence of the US environmental movement, developing a new ski area in the Western US became increasingly difficult and increasingly expensive (due to litigation). The environmental movement created greater uncertainty for developers and larger barriers to entry—making BC a relatively attractive alternative.

4.2.1.1 US Forest Service Policies

All of the formulas and policy that I wrote came out of the US Forest Service. (Ski/Resort Policy Informant #1, July, 2015)

The US Forest Service was the statutory authority for special use permits on US Forest Service land of up to eighty acres\(^4\). Because of legislative restrictions on the amount of land being permitted for long periods the US Forest Service employed a two-permit system—known as a special use permit procedure\(^5\). The first use permit was issued for up to thirty years\(^6\) at the base of the mountain; this area would accommodate significant infrastructure development (e.g. lodge, hotels, retail, etc.). The second use permit covered a much larger section, the alpine area. The two permit system was developed to create financial security for the developers. Dividing the ski area into two different areas acknowledged the concentration of development in the base area while working within the legislated boundaries.

\(^4\) Authority was granted to them under the Organic Act of 1897, and later clarified by the Secretary of Agriculture James Wilson’s interpretation in 1907: that all forest resources were for use, subject only to sustainability (Briggs, 2000).

\(^5\) The US Forest Service was legislated to issue use permits of up to eighty acres for no longer than thirty years.

\(^6\) Once the initial permits expired, they could be renewed but were subject to negotiations
Lease fees were collected through a graduated rate fee system. The fees were calculated as a percentage of gross sales across nine business categories in the resort. Criticised for being overly complicated, a resort planner that was interviewed jokingly stated: "They would get teams of auditors, and would spend $20 million to collect $200,000" (Resort Planner #2, July 2015).

The policies developed and implemented by the US Forest Services greatly influenced those created in BC. Before Whistler was created, BC operated on a lease-develop-purchase model. This model used ten-year leases which the minister could cancel at any time—reducing the developer's financial security. The US Forest Service policies were far more sophisticated than any ski policy being used in BC. They informed the foundational aspects of the policies that govern Whistler and can be seen in the Commercial Alpine Ski Policy (1982) and the All-Season Resort Policy (2005).

4.2.1.2 Impacts of the US Environmental Movement

Ski resort development involves dramatically transforming a mountain from its natural state to one that is ready for skiing. Ski runs need to be cleared, towers and lifts erected, base areas are developed, and infrastructure built. This development can have significant impacts on the local environment. Between 1960 and 1975, a major ski resort was being developed on US Forest Service land at a rate of one-per-year (Briggs, 2000).

At the same time that such development was occurring, views on the environment were changing: "changes in environmentally related attitudes and behaviour evident in the United States in the late 1960s and early 1970s border on the incredible" (Albrecht, 1976, p. 154). Conflict arose between a growing ski industry and the maturing environmental movement. Mineral King resort "epitomised the conflict involving conservationists, private industry, and government" (Browning, 1972, p. 65). Walt Disney Productions proposed building Mineral King—a $35 million ski resort in the Sierra Nevada Mountains. The resort plan was approved by the US Forest Service in January 1969, by June of that year the Sierra Club filed a suit seeking preliminary and permanent injunctions against the project. The most controversial aspect of the proposal was Disney's plan to build a 24-mile access road and high-voltage power line through Sequoia National Park (Briggs, 2000). The US Supreme Court and the Appeals Court

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7 Discussed in more fully section 4.2.3
8 Sierra Club is a prominent environmental preservation organisation
dismissed the Sierra Club’s claim, but the battle continued in the media. Disney eventually abandoned the project.

Mineral King’s legacy in the US ski industry quickly became apparent as environmental groups filed suits concerning proposed ski resorts. In stark contrast to the sector’s rapid growth in the 60s and 70s, only one new resort was built on US Forest Service land between 1980 and the early 90s. In this litigious environment "only very well-funded and brave individuals can withstand the costly and time-consuming process [of developing ski resorts]" (Briggs, 2000, p. 101).

Changing socio-political landscapes hampered ski resort development in the US—making it increasingly expensive and unpopular. This barriers-to-entry in the US market was leveraged in British Columbia. Industry specialists in BC touted that it had fewer barriers-to-entry, excellent potential products, and a willing government to help. Ski/Resort Policy Informant #1 recalls speaking to the Aspen Ski Corporation around this time about developing Blackcomb Mountain: "They couldn't believe that it was possible to come to British Columbia and be able to open 18 months after first looking at [Blackcomb]. Compared to the States, it was like heaven" (July, 2015).

4.2.2. Recreational Resources

There was an influx of scholarly work being done on leisure Post War. In 1952, the US held a conferenced called ‘Resources for the Future’. The meeting eventually led to the establishment of the Outdoor Recreational Resource Review Commission (ORRRC) by the US Congress in 1958. The primary objective of ORRRC was to assess the demand for recreational resources within the nation by 1976 and 2000 (Wolfe, 1964). ORRRC defines recreation resources as:

Outdoor recreation resources shall mean the land and waters areas and associated resources of such areas which provide or may in the future provide opportunities for outdoor recreation, irrespective of ownership...shall not mean nor include recreation facilities, programs, and opportunities usually associated with urban development such as playgrounds, stadia, golf courses, city parks and zoos. (U.S. Congress, 1958 as cited in University of British Columbia, School of Community and Regional Planning, 1970)
Similarly, in 1961 the Resources for Tomorrow Conference was held in Canada, it highlighted nine academic papers concerning recreational resource within the nation (Wolf, 1964). The Post-War era introduced recreation academic vernacular and embedded it within a general resource discourse.

4.2.2.1 Recreational Resources in British Columbia

By the mid 1960s, the Squamish-Lillooet area began receiving national attention when Whistler was being discussed as a potential candidate for the 1968 Winter Olympics. Although its bid would prove to be unsuccessful; the consideration caught the attention of the provincial government (Gill and Williams, 2011). Two reports on the area were published in 1970. One report, Planning for the Squamish-Lillooet Region: Fulfilling its Recreation Opportunities, was developed in the School of Community and Regional Planning at the University of British Columbia (UBC). The other report, Regional Development Framework for the Area Between Squamish and Pemberton, was developed by the BC Department of Municipal Affairs. Both reports shared the common theoretical framework of recreational resources. Examining three potential ski areas: Whistler, Powder Mountain, and Brohm Ridge, the reports explored the potential of each area using recreational resources as the measure. The UBC report stated that the study’s overarching goal was: "optimise the development of the recreational resources of the Region" (p.7). The report prepared by the Ministry developed a recreational resource map of the study area (see Appendix E). The two reports exemplify the foundational logic of ski resort development at that time and the interest of ski development within the province.

4.2.3. Cypress Model

Cypress Bowl can become the test tube of this Government’s ability to engineer, to design and to construct recreational developments which will be a matter of pride to the people of this Province and an attraction to those who can come to this Province and use those facilities. (Williams, 1971, Feb 26).

Before Whistler was incorporated and the Whistler model was used as the framework to develop resorts in BC, another model was being used—the Cypress model. Operating between 1964 and 1972, the model’s implementation and subsequent failure were critical moments in the evolution of BC ski policy. The Cypress model was
used at Cypress Bowl, Brohm Ridge, and Powder Mountain. Its failure highlighted the political nature of ski area development and the need for more sophisticated policies.

The Cypress model was grounded in a lease-develop-purchase scheme, which had been a popular way of transferring large sections of Crown land to private owners\(^9\). The land was leased by the province to an individual for up to ten years, once the lease expired the lessee had an option to purchase the land once certain conditions were met. For the Cypress model, these conditions involved developing a threshold of ski-lift capacity. The initial land lease also included several resource extraction tenures, including timber licenses and/or mineral claims, which allowed the lessee to clear the land and raise initial capital for development. The ten-year lease period was designed to combat speculative real-estate investment and give the developers sufficient time to develop sufficient lift capacity—therefore allowing them to exercise their purchase options. None of the developments made it past this initial ten-year lease.

Construction on Cypress Bowl began in 1964 when Alpine Outdoor Resources produced a development plan. Timber and mining licences and land leases were granted by the provincial government shortly after. By 1968 citizens from West Vancouver—located at the base of the mountain—became increasingly vocal with their concerns: "On Black Mountain [one of the two mountains which comprise Cypress Bowl] the clearing was excessive, on Strong Mountain [the other mountain] the clearing was excessive, and he found that it was scarcely an area developed for recreational purposes" (Williams, 1970, February 5). It was becoming evident that the activities in Cypress Bowl were focused on resource extraction and not building a ski area: "the timber that was sold by these promoters, who had no intention of developing a proper ski ground" (Dowding, 1971, January 28). Around this time Alpine Outdoor Resources reportedly lacked the sufficient capital to continue the project. Allegations began circulating that the money generated by the timber sales were being transferred to a subsidiary in the Caribbean. In 1969 the rights to develop an expansive residential subdivision was granted by the province. It became apparent that Cypress Bowl was going to be "100% real-estate with some skiing" (Resort Planner Informant #1, July

\(^9\)The policy was originally developed in Peace River in 1963 in order to curb speculation and encourage the immediate development of the Crown land. It was adopted by the entire province in 1965 (Begg, 2007).
Through this public outcry, the province rescinded the lease and created a provincial park on the land.

The Cypress model was concurrently used in two other ski developments: Powder Mountain and Brohm Ridge. Powder Mountain was nicknamed "Junior Cypress Bowl" (Williams, 1975, June 19). Criticised for being principally a "logging operation" (Dowding, 1971, February 26) and a "real estate development…not a ski resort" (Barrett, 1972, January 24). By 1972 the developers ran out of financing, and the project was put on hold. Brohm Ridge was plagued by similar financial difficulties as Powder Mountain and Cypress Bowl. However, unlike the other two developments, Brohm Ridge had a lodge at the summit and lift poles erected before declaring bankruptcy. Adi Bauer, a former Austrian Olympic skier and developer of Brohm Ridge, eventually served one month in jail for defrauding his investors.

The three ski developments, Cypress Bowl, Powder Mountain, and Brohm Ridge all suffered crippling financial difficulties. Williams (1970, February 5) suggested that these were caused by the inadequacy of the lease-develop-purchase policy:

Now, if the developers at Cypress Bowl fell down because of lack of finance, and if the developers in Powder Mountain are falling down because of lack of finance, then we are going to have the same thing at Powder Mountain as we had at Cypress Bowl, and the policy of the Department of Lands, Mr. Chairman, of a lease-develop-purchase, does not prevent this from happening. As a matter of fact, it encourages this to happen.

Unlike residential development, ski area development consists of massive value-creation. Previous remote Crown-land undergoes a major physical transformation (the addition of ski infrastructure) which increases the value of the base area and adjacent land. The lease-develop-purchase model was designed to protect against speculative real-estate development, which assumes an inherent value of land. The level of value-creation for ski areas is directly linked to the activities of the developer. A ten-year land lease is a deterrent for any investor as it does not provide an adequate window to see a return on their investment: "The people who put the investment in the lifts need to control the land at the bottom" (Ski/Resort Policy Informant #1, July 2015).

Meanwhile, the public was losing confidence in the government's ability to develop ski areas. It was the wild west for ski development in the province. Irresponsible
resource extraction, offshore shell companies, financial ruin, and investor fraud—the industry lost the public’s trust. Something had to change.

4.2.3.1 Cypress Narrative

The Cypress Model was designed to be a pivotal achievement of the Social-Credit (a.k.a. So-Cred) government—intended to be a model of how ski resorts ought to be developed. However, as the development began to fail, coupled with a changing political tide, the Cypress development morphed into a weapon for the political opposition—the New Democratic Party (NDP). The NDP crafted a nearly fantastical narrative of Cypress’ development history—wastefulness, gross incompetence, and massive environmental degradation were key themes. Grounded in the party’s discourse of the So-Cred government’s ineptitude, the narrative "shook public confidence in the [So-Cred] Government as no other issue in recent years [had] done" (Clarke, 1970, p. 8).

Below are a few excerpts taken from the legislative assembly demonstrating how the NDP presented this narrative:

Cypress Bowl is another waste of money by this Government. These are the things that the Government should bring out in their Throne Speech. They said nothing about Cypress Bowl in the Throne Speech and about the mistake that they made. When the Honourable the Minister of Lands and Forests gets up and makes his announcement that Cypress Bowl is going to be a park operated by this Government and he does it quite openly as if it were something wonderful, I agree that it is high time. I think that the Government should hang their head in shame for what has gone on in Cypress Bowl. (Nimsick, February 1 1971)

Mr. Speaker. Naughty, naughty, and the whole mess came crashing in on their heads, and they blandly stand up and say, not that they made a mistake, not that they goofed on this thing for five years, not that they didn't heed the warnings that they were getting...They make policy on the seat of their pants, Mr. Speaker, and when the going gets rough they just shift chairs. And they've got very short memories. (Barrett, February 8 1971)

This narrative was strategically employed in two critical moments in BC’s evolutionary pathway. The first instance took place on June 19th, 1975. The NDP government was in power, and the legislative assembly met to vote on passing the Resort Municipality of Whistler Act (RMOW-Act). The party framed the objective of the RMOW-Act as:
The intent is that there should be no more Cypress Bowls in the province, there should be no more [Brohm] Ridges, there should be no more Powder Mountains. (Williams, 1975, June 19).

Then after a lengthy debate when a decision needed to be made, the choice was described as:

If they prefer the old So-Cred Cypress Bowl way, then they should speak against this bill, and they should vote against this bill. (Williams, 1975, June 19)

The Cypress narrative was used to frame what exactly Whistler would be, and more precisely—what it would not be.

The second instance was on July 25th, 1979, the So-Cred government had regained power and was attempting to pass Bill 34. Bill 34 would amend the RMOW-Act to allow the creation of a resort association (see section 4.3.3). The Bill was criticised as being a public bill which promoted private interests; the NDP attacked the bill by drawing comparisons to the Cypress model:

A plan in Bill 34 that will benefit foreign corporations that will benefit private developers, that will help private speculators, on a scale we haven't seen in this province for years. It has been years since we saw a Cypress Bowl go ahead under Social Credit. (Barber, 1979)

The Cypress narrative became a framing tool for political positioning. New resort proposals or changes to existing ones were compared to the narrative that the NDP created. It became political ammunition to help control how ski areas were being developed in the province.

4.2.4. Instant Towns Act

In 1965 British Columbia passed the Instant Towns Act, this Act became a foundational piece of the Whistler Model. As mentioned above, the lease-develop-purchase model (which informed the Cypress model) was the primary method to develop remote Crown land outside municipalities; the Instant Town allowed the provincial government to incorporate a municipality on remote uninhabited Crown land. The Act provided the government with an innovative municipal development tool; the Act created the legislative groundwork for the Resort Municipality of Whistler Act.
Large scale municipal development became popular in BC after World War II. Efforts to rebuild Europe and Japan created a new market for BC's primary resources; meanwhile, a wave of soldiers returning from war was looking for jobs and places to live. Anticipating the demand for jobs, the Coalition government created a team of Members of the Legislative Assembly—the Post-War Rehabilitation Council—to tour the province and tackle these issues (Roy and Thompson, 2005). The Council published a report advocating for the expansion of the resource industry through public-private development (Markey, Halseth, and Manson, 2008). These partnerships were embodied in their new single-industry towns throughout the province.

Traditional single-industry towns (or company towns) are centred around a single resource industry with one controlling company. Prevalent in Ontario and Quebec, single-industry towns took an array of forms: mining towns, smelting towns, textile towns, pulp and paper towns, sawmill towns, and railway towns (Lucas, 2008). The management and governance responsibilities rested solely on the controlling company. Planning and development in these towns were created to "recruit, house and retain a labour force to operate the industry" (Bowles, 1992, p. 72). Bowles (1992) called this form of planning as Additive Planning which is where the development and governance of the community are simply added onto the current duties of the company's manager.

These traditional single-industry towns would not solve BC's post-war problems. The returning servicemen needed places to live and raise a family—not just work temporarily. More permanent and sustainable settlements were required to develop the province's hinterlands. Developing stable communities in underdeveloped parts of the province would help disperse the growing population and reduce densification issues that major urban centres faced. Industry partners were suddenly given a stable workforce and no longer had the burden of governing the community.

Before 1965, to incorporate a municipality in the province the local community would petition the provincial government. The petition consisted of the names of at least three-fifths of the local residents\textsuperscript{10} in the area, a proposed boundary of the new town, a Letters Patent, and the conditions of municipal borrowing privileges (Halseth and Sullivan, 2002). Once the petition was accepted by the provincial government a

\textsuperscript{10} Residents were defined as land owning persons who are at least 21 years old
A referendum was required. The process of incorporating a municipality was purposively designed to be difficult in order to protect the provincial government from any unwarranted financial obligations (Halseth and Sullivan, 2002). This involved process became a hindrance in the post-war boom. The provincial government sought to develop a new mechanism to expedite the incorporation of single-industry towns.

The W.A.C. Bennett, Social Credit, the government made significant amendments to the Municipal Act in 1965. During their 'Province Building' campaign, the Bennett government addressed the Act's innate impediment on development. Amending the Act and inserting Section 10A which served as a loophole and would allow the incorporation of areas without an existing population—this amendment is informally known as the Instant Town Act. Section 10A states:

> Notwithstanding Section 10, where...it is in the public interest to establish municipality in conjunction with the development of a natural resource...[the Provincial Government] may, by Letters Patent, incorporate...any area of land...into a municipality upon the receipt of a petition from at least five owners of land within the area. (Section 10, Municipal Act, 1965 as cited in Halseth and Sullivan, 2002)

Simply by a Letters Patent and a petition of five land-owners, any area of land within the province could be incorporated.

The resource companies were given the means to incorporate through the Instant Town Act, but there was still a large amount of influence on these towns by the provincial government, industrial partners, and outside market conditions. The provincial government "exercised stringent controls over the growth, shape and development of the resource towns" (Bradbury, 1977, p. 218). This occurred, specifically through the community planning process—all community plans in these instant towns required the approval of the provincial government. Because there was no base population, electing a first council was done through special permissions granted in the Letters Patent. An interim council was elected for the first five years; these council members were primarily managers from the resource company (Bradbury, 1977). Though the instant towns often looked and felt similar to other rural communities, they were fundamentally different because of the level of control given to the private company and provincial government.

The communities that were created through the Instant Towns Act still exist in the province. They include: Port Alice, Gold River, Hudson's Hope, Port McNeil, MacKenzie,

4.2.5. Silver Book

The [Silver Book] was really the blueprint [for Whistler]. (Municipal Officer Informant #4, July, 2015)

Forming a vision of what Whistler was to become was a critical question for early developers. The Community Development Study for the Whistler Mountain Area, known as the Silver Book emerged from a series of meetings between the provincial and regional government, resort experts, and Whistler residents. Published in 1974 it created the cognitive groundwork of what Whistler was and where it should go. The endurance of its vision is remarkable, “if you go through the five or six [official community plans], including the Silver Book, it’s absolutely consistent...Each subsequent community plan just took it a step further” (Municipal Officer Informant #4, July 2015). Each plan was an iteration of Whistler’s original vision.

The Silver Book instilled three critical elements that shaped Whistler’s identity: (1) a focus on human-scale development, (2) developing a critical mass in the village, and (3) emphasising limits to growth. Ski/Resort Policy Informant #1, who was present during the initial meetings, remembers how different Whistler’s development could have been: "they almost made the village at the bottom a French style high-rise village" (July 2015). Instead, the members steered the development style towards a warmer community design at a human scale. Secondly, the principle that the village should be developed in a compact manner to "ensure the economic viability of the centre, the establishment of new commercial ventures in other locations is to be discouraged" (Silver Book, 1974, p. 25). Density was enforced by the creation of a moratorium on commercial development outside the village to help create its critical mass (Municipal Officer Informant #4, July 2015). Finally, the Silver Book seriously considered limits to growth.11 By comparing the recreation potential of the Whistler area to limiting factors such as sewage, ecological

11 The notion of limits to growth would eventually manifest as ‘bed units’.
health, and transportation, it essentially placed a set capacity on growth. The Silver Book was and continues to be, a driving force in defining Whistler’s identity.

4.2.6. Resort Municipality of Whistler Act

We don’t know how [Whistler is] going to work. It's an experiment. We believe that there may have to change as time goes along, but this has been studied at great length, and I believe we have covered most of the problems that might arise. However, there may have to be amendments brought in from time to time. But we will see as time progresses (Lorimer, Jun 24, 1975)

The incorporation of the Resort Municipality of Whistler was a critical juncture in the evolution of resort development pathway. The confluence of forces generated the necessary momentum to reach this decision. Whistler was not created in a vacuum; these events played a key role in shaping its development. For example, in a report suggesting the governance structure of Whistler the authors recommended a variety of models: regional district administration; improvement districts; public lands management; expanded regional district capability; regional district reincorporation; municipal reorganization, as an extension of Squamish; municipal organization, the creation of a large new municipality; or establishment of a “Recreation Area” under the Park Act (Blakely and Associates, 1974). However, the government chose to use the municipal development model to develop the ski area. Incorporating a municipality to develop a ski resort was a new and innovative concept. The provincial government had an array of possible methods to develop Whistler, yet they chose to retain a familiar one, suggesting that the decisions made in the past influence future decisions.

These disjointed forces shaped the development of Whistler. The Resort Municipality of Whistler Act (RMOW-Act) in itself represents a critical juncture in the evolutionary pathway. The government at the time chose to create a unique piece of legislation in lieu of amending an existing Act or incorporating under the Instant Town Act. The RMOW-Act was designed to be a self-contained experiment—a policy incubator for the province. As identified through the Cypress Bowl debacle, the province was in desperate need for more sophisticated ski policies; Whistler was purposively designed to solve this issue.
Whistler was always intertwined with politics--it was designed as the ‘signature project’ of the NDP government (Provincial Officer Informant #1, July 2015). The RMOW-Act reflected this connection by legislating that "one alderman appointed by the Minister" sits on the first Council (RMOW-Act 1975). Al Raine, the newly appointed Ski Area Coordinator for the Province, was given this position\(^{12}\). Wearing two hats, Al Raine embodied the relationship between Whistler and the provincial government.

The independence of the RMOW-Act allowed the province to test ski policies\(^{13}\), which would be later exported across the province. Eventually, these evolved into an omnibus ski policy—the Whistler model. These policies were created, tested and evolved within a protected space set up by the RMOW-Act.

### 4.3. Phase 2: Developing a Critical Mass

![Figure 6: Phase 2 of the Resort Governance Evolutionary Pathway](image)

The second phase of the evolutionary pathway is concerned with developing a critical mass. Just as Ebbinghaus (2005) described a ‘well-trodden trail’, the critical mass is developed through a series of events that reinforce the pathway—each decision along the pathway makes the next decision easier and easier. Importantly, this phase is not yet locked-in, it is still evolving and pathfinding. Unlike the first phase, the events are interwoven with one another, and Whistler’s aligns well with this perspective. This

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\(^{12}\) He would be the only one who held this position  
\(^{13}\) Which were primarily derived from the US Forest Service policies
study’s research identified five events that helped the pathway develop a critical mass:
(1) Whistler’s nimbleness and ability to pivot when confronted with a new provincial
government, (2) the investment of public funds in Whistler, (3) the creation of the Resort
Association of Whistler, (4) the development of the Commercial Alpine Ski Policy, and
(5) the introduction of the Municipal Regional District Tax.

4.3.1. Changing Political Regime

The link between politics and planning are very close. (Provincial Officer
Informant #1, July 2015)

In 1975 the So-Cred Government won the provincial election. Whistler—the
“signature project of the [(New Democratic Party)] NDP”\(^{14}\) (Provincial Officer Informant
#1, July 2015)—needed to pivot. Specifically, the political change sparked two separate
events: firstly, it created a space for a competing organisation to challenge the
overarching vision of Whistler\(^{15}\); secondly, the relationship between the municipality and
the province needed to be realigned to fit within the So-Cred’s more neoliberal
ideologies.

In its infancy, the Resort Municipality of Whistler (RMOW) had just approved its
first Official Community Plan (OCP)\(^{16}\). Centred on a controversial vision of the village,
co-developed by the previous provincial government, this OCP was put in precarious
position. It no longer had the direct support of the ruling government. A group of
landowners called the Whistler Development Association (WDA) saw an opportunity in
the change of government and created a rival OCP: Resort Community of Whistler:
Update ‘76. The WDA community plan was significantly different from the original vision.
The single-centre design was changed to a multi-centred and moved away from the
Olympic lands\(^{17}\), closer to a parcel of land the group owned. The WDA submitted their
proposal to the Minister shortly after the change in government: “they were licking their
chops as soon as the NDP was gone” (Ski/Resort Policy Informant #1, July 2015).

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\(^{14}\) The NDP was in power between 1972 to 1975; it was the NDP that incorporated the RMOW
\(^{15}\) As outlined in the Silver Book
\(^{16}\) This plan was approved by the Minister and was heavily influenced by the Silver Book
\(^{17}\) This land-base was frozen by the Province for potential use for the necessary expansion to
host the Olympics
Whistler's entire council travelled to the capital to visit the newly appointed Minister of Municipal Affairs—Hugh Curtis—after they heard of the competing proposal. Armed with the letters of resignation, the Council went to fight for their vision of Whistler. The Minister quickly dispelled any concerns that they would accept the WDA's proposal. However, he stated that Whistler would need to change to reflect the ideologies of the new provincial leadership. The So-Cred government, for political reasons, could "not go the same route the NDP were going to go" (Ski/Resort Policy Informant #1, July 2015). Whistler needed to pivot.

The fundamental relationship between the municipality and the provincial government, as outlined in the RMOWAct, needed to change. The legislation was amended in 1976 to reflect a more neoliberal doctrine:

The 1975 Act reads:

The minister may construct, acquire, operate and maintain sewers and sewage disposal facilities, trunk water mains and water supply systems and such other municipal works and services in the municipality as he considers appropriate. [emphasis added] (1975)

The amendment in 1976 reads:

The municipality may construct, acquire, operate and maintain sewers and sewage disposal facilities, trunk water mains and water-supply systems and such other municipal works and services in the municipality as the council consider appropriate. [emphasis added] (1976)

The 1975 Act reads:

The minister may, by regulation, establish rates and charges to be imposed upon land and improvements, as defined in the Municipal Act, in the municipality for works or services referred to in subsection (1), including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, any kind of charge referred to in section 532, 568, 569, or 570 of that Act, and the regulation may provide that those rates and charges shall be levied and collected by the municipality as if they were rates and charges imposed under that Act; but proceeds of the collection of those rates and charges shall be paid into the Consolidated Revenue Fund. [emphasis added] (1975).

The amendment in 1976 reads:

The council may, by by-law, establish rates and charges to be imposed upon land and improvements, as defined in the Municipal Act, in the
municipality for works or services referred to in subsection (1), including, without limiting the generality of the foregoing, any kind of charge referred to in sections 532, 568, 569, or 570 of the Act, **and the by-law may provide that those rates and charges shall be levied and collected by the municipality.** [emphasis added] (1976).

Essentially the legislation was changed to remove some of the provincial oversight and empowered the municipality. It gave the RMOW the right to impose developer cost charges and collect revenues from these. Before these amendments, the province was responsible for providing the majority of services to the municipality. Although not done through legislation, another significant change occurred in 1976 when the Whistler Village Land Company (WVLC) was created. The WVLC was a subsidiary corporation of the RMOW\(^{18}\) and was tasked with buying village land from the province for development purposes. In 1978 the Olympic lands (53 acres) were transferred to the WVLC.

The changes in 1976, one year after Whistler’s incorporation, dramatically changed the role of the municipality and its relationship to the provincial government. The RMOW weathered its first major threat by being able to pivot strategically. While the change in government had made Whistler vulnerable to attacks, but instead of crumbling the community was nimble and strategically interpreted its vision to fit within the ideology of the new provincial government.

### 4.3.2. Federal and Provincial Funding

Big public money was spent in Whistler. The provincial and federal governments both invested significant financial capital into the municipality. The money was primarily used to develop core infrastructure that would not have otherwise been developed through regular market forces. The public funds were used for a variety of projects which include: a sewage disposal facility, underground parkades, convention centre, tax-shelter for hotel investors, and a major bailout of the Whistler Village Land Company.

The initial planning reports that outlined Whistler’s recreational resources\(^{19}\) recognized the need for a comprehensive sewage system and the potential adverse effects on the area’s aquatic resources if not appropriately addressed. Sewage disposal facilities are typically funded through municipal property tax revenue, because they are

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\(^{18}\) All shares were held by the RMOW

\(^{19}\) Identified in both the UBC report and the report developed by the Department of Municipal Affairs (see section 4.2.2)
normally used primarily by local residents. However, tourism communities are unique in their influx of non-residents (tourists) who create additional waste. Early policy makers in Whistler and the province successfully petitioned both the provincial and federal government to jointly fund the construction of a $10 million sewage disposal facility.\textsuperscript{20} The creation of the sewage disposal facility was beyond the scope of traditional municipal funding; however, it was necessary infrastructure for Whistler to work.

As well, an underground parkade and convention centre were funded through another federal and provincial joint venture—the Travel Industry Development Subsidiary Agreement (TIDSA). The TIDSA program was a federal initiative designed to facilitate “concerted planning efforts [which] are needed to establish a more harmoniously functioning tourism system” (Travel Industry Development Subsidiary Agreement, 1979, p.1). In 1978 the BC government agreed to a $50 million deal\textsuperscript{21}. The agreement outlined a 50/50 funding split between the federal and BC government. The ski industry was identified as a vital component of BC’s TIDSA objective—the funds were intended to “make [BC] as big of a skiing Mecca as possible” (Resort Planner Informant #1, July 2015). To meet this goal $30.5 million (62\% of the total funding) was allocated towards ski related projects. Whistler received $10.5 million.

Without that [TIDSA] funding, we wouldn't have the industry that we have today...There was a very solid foundation created by that fund, and it established the first steps of the ski industry in a big way in British Columbia. (Resort Planner Informant #1, July 2015)

TIDSA funding in Whistler was used to shift the power dynamics between the municipality and developers dramatically. In BC, for every $1.00 of TIDSA funding spent $13.67 was invested by industry (Montgomery, 1980). Access to finance gave the municipality more bargaining power with developers. Specifically, the municipality leveraged the funds to develop the underground parkade in the village and the conference centre\textsuperscript{22}, two projects that may have otherwise not been possible.

\textsuperscript{20}Within the provincial government legislative assembly, the funding of the sewage system reiterated the need for further provincial oversight: this government, if it is to put $10 million into sewage disposal facilities in this unique municipality, I think has every right to be sure that it has at least one voice in the first council” (Wallace, 1975, June 24).

\textsuperscript{21} The program's second largest (see Appendix F for a complete overview)

\textsuperscript{22} Originally designed to be a skating rink (Resort Planner Informant #2, July 2015)
Complementing the TIDSA, a Multi-Use Residential Building program (MURB) that provided tax shelters for investors was created to stimulate development. “TIDSA and MURB helped [Whistler] develop the critical mass” needed to move forward (Municipal Officer Informant #4, July 2015). The MURB program created a favourable environment for investors. In Whistler, many of the hotels and condominiums in the original village were built because of MURB.

Finally, in 1983 a $21 million loan was secured by the provincial government to take over the assets and liabilities of the Whistler Village Land Company—essentially the provincial government stepped in to bailout a bankrupt Whistler. The bailout came after “the wheels fell off” (Municipal Officer Informant #1, July 2015) in Whistler due to, a global recession, and the MURB program was cancelled. In its place, the Whistler Land Company (WLC) Developments, a Crown Corporation, was created to resume control of the assets and continue operations. Fortunately, TIDSA funding remained in place and helped shelter Whistler from the market and environmental realities.

The level and timing of provincial and federal investment in Whistler were pivotal to its survival and on-going development. The funds helped develop key infrastructure, empowered the municipality to leverage more from its developers, enticing on-going investment, and protect it from some other unanticipated stressors. The public money helped Whistler build its critical mass, despite turbulent market conditions.

4.3.3. Resort Association Amendment

I think that we should perhaps retitle the bill "A Bill to Create the Sovereign State of Whistler"... They are creating a sovereign state. Maybe they should appoint a king of Whistler. Maybe that king should be the MLA for Whistler himself. It is a sorry thing indeed, Mr. Speaker, that a member of this chamber can be so pressured by his friends — unnamed so far — to push for this statute and bring it into this House to benefit those few friends at the expense of democracy and fair play. (Lauk, July 25, 1979)

In the 1970s, Whistler was being developed in the spotlight. In 1978 the original village commenced a large expansion. The village was nestled in the valley between Whistler and Blackcomb mountains, and was originally designed to service both. The

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23 Many people in the public viewed the loan as a “bailout for the rich” (Gripton, 2006)
24 Owned by the provincial government
provincial government issued a call for proposals, attracting proponents to develop Blackcomb Mountain. The Aspen Skiing Corporation won the bid with their proposal. Before accepting the project they asked for two significant amendments to the current provincial ski policy. They sought: (1) the power to establish a local resort association with mandatory membership and taxing authority with the sole purpose of marketing the resort collectively (Municipal Officer Informant #4, July 2015); and (2) to remove the Railway Act’s legislated authority in setting chairlift prices.

A resort association is a cooperative marketing organisation specific to a community; its membership is comprised of local businesses. Operating as a legal entity, the resort association imposes mandatory membership and can impose levies on its members. The mandatory membership eliminates potential free riders and reduces internal competition. The purpose of the resort association is to act as a single voice for the community’s mass marketing. The resort association would be able to offer guests a central reservation system, a single point of contact for the resort. The collaborative efforts of its membership would facilitate larger events and village animation. What is good for the resort is good for the resort businesses.

The amendment to the Resort Municipality of Whistler Act, Bill 34, which allowed for the creation of a local resort association was "the most controversial piece of legislation for the [legislative assembly] (Ski/Resort Policy Informant #1, July 2015). The original Bill which framed the organisation’s membership were like corporate shares: "the original rules were going to be that your membership strength was based on the fee you paid per year” (Ski/Resort Policy Informant #1, July 2015). The corporate shares structure sparked Mr. Lauk’s damning quote (above) stating that the Bill was undemocratic. The Bill was quickly retooled and changed to a one person one vote model, and eventually passed.

The proposed amendment to the Railway Act was non-controversial. The old system required the Minister of Commercial Transport's approval to any changes in lift ticket prices. In practice, it required the lift operator to submit a formal request to the

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25 The Aspen Skiing Corporation was seeking a new market as the US environmental movement was making it increasingly difficult to develop a new resort in the States.
26 Membership is technically tied to the title of the resort land
27 The bill had support from senior party members who wanted to show Aspen Ski Corporation that they would be good partners (Ski/Resort Policy Informant #1, July 2015)
Minister and then receive approval through an Order in Council. Everyone recognised its inefficiencies and the amendment passed with no opposition.

These policy changes were direct consequences of the Aspen Skiing Corporation agreeing to develop Blackcomb Mountain. There was a co-evolutionary process occurring between Whistler's development and the provincial ski policy. As Whistler was built-out, the provincial ski policy was being tooled and refined. The Aspen Skiing Corporation employed their extensive experience in resort development to help identify problematic areas in the legislation. Notably, the amendment to the Railway Act affected the entire province; while the resort association amendment only affected Whistler—furthering Whistler's mandate of being the province’s ski policy incubator.

4.3.4. Commercial Alpine Ski Policy

According to Balfour [treasurer of the Canada West Ski Areas Association], much of the original impetus behind Whistler's phenomenal growth—and that of other resorts now following its lead—lies with the B.C. Lands Commercial Alpine Ski Policy. Balfour calls it ‘the roadmap on how to develop a ski area.’ (Financial Post Magazine, 1996).

The Commercial Alpine Ski Policy (CASP) was the first piece of the Whistler model that left the policy incubator—Whistler. As demonstrated with the Cypress model, there was a growing demand for more sophisticated ski policies. The current lease-develop-purchase model placed too much risk for developers to begin major projects, which was disjointed with the provincial government’s goal of “expansion of employment, revenue and recreational opportunities” (CASP, 1982). The government needed a solution. Whistler had adopted an equation, from the US Forest Service policies, that rewarded accommodation units for uphill carrying capacity. CASP built on these foundational pieces and created the blueprint for establishing successful ski areas in BC.

CASP created a policy framework that served three major purposes: (1) issuing land tenures, (2) defining different ski areas, and (3) outlining a procedural guide for

28 Kept secluded by the RMOW-Act
29 Before CASP Crown land was leased for ten-year increments: "Government policy [made it] impossible. A ten-year lease—nobody in their right mind would put money into this" (Ski/Resort Policy Informant #1, July 2015).
30 “Whistler’s [lands for lifts] formula was for every additional two people ski capacity, earned another bed” (Resort Planner Informant #1, July 2015)
developers and government. CASP was only applicable on provincial Crown land, (i.e. land owned and controlled by the provincial government). In BC provincial Crown land covers 94% of the total land base and is where the majority of ski area development occurs. Similar to the US Forest Service policies, CASP uses four different land-tenure tools: lease, a license of operation, right of way, and direct sales. Leases are issued for land used for ski infrastructure, such as alpine day lodges and skier parking lots. Licenses of operation are used to the piste land and other alpine terrains. Right of ways applies to lands being used for lifts and tows. Finally, direct sales were given for base area town sites, which would host accommodation, entertainment, retail and other businesses.

Leases, licenses of operation, and right of way tenures all had a lifespan of up to 20 or 30 years\textsuperscript{31}; rents were charged at a rate of 2\% of lift revenues\textsuperscript{32}. Direct land sales were done incrementally through phases\textsuperscript{33}, land was sold at the market value of unimproved land\textsuperscript{34}. The direct sale of Crown land was made incrementally on a perform and reward model, e.g. lands for lifts.

CASP categorized two types of ski areas: type 1 and type 2. A type 1 ski area is a community level operation that focuses on day-use skiing and has no overnight accommodation. Type 2 ski area is a major operation which services an entire region or international markets, it is associated with other recreational facilities and has overnight accommodation. Finally, CASP created a procedural framework for developing ski areas which include: expression of interest, formal proposal, financial performance guarantee, ski area master plan, and master developer agreement. These three elements combined created a framework for provincial ski area development.

CASP is a reflection of the lessons learned from previous ski policies and the success of Whistler. Through the Cypress debacle, the government recognized that its

\textsuperscript{31} Depending on the category of the ski area: type 1 received 20 year leases, and type 2 received 30 year leases
\textsuperscript{32} This was largely influenced by the US Forest Service model with one notable difference, instead of charging rent based on total revenue of all business operating (which created an accounting burden) they only charged rent based on lift revenues (Resort Planner Informant #2, July 2015).
\textsuperscript{33} Phases were defined and agreed upon in the approved Ski Area Master Plan and are primarily based on a similar lands-for-lifts formula seen in Whistler
\textsuperscript{34} Land was assessed by third party regulators during development, valuation was retained for ten years
current policies were a hindrance to ski development and created an opportunity to be
abused. Therefore, creating a strict protocol between the government and proponent
was necessary to keep that relationship in check. The 10-year lease policy failed to give
developers the necessary financial security to make such a significant investment, CASP
addressed this by issuing longer leases and the contingent sale of some land. The
perform-and-reward model\textsuperscript{35} borrowed from Whistler is a central component of the policy
as it allows “the people who put the investment in the lifts…control the land at the
bottom” (Ski/Resort Policy Informant #1, July 2015). Each component of CASP has a
traceable history, either borrowing from successful policies and incorporating key
lessons.

\subsection*{4.3.5. Municipal and Regional District Tax}

Garry Watson and I asked, how the hell do we operate Whistler without
burdening the ratepayers? (Ski/Resort Policy Informant #1, July, 2015)

Resort communities have unique financial burdens. They are often expected to
fund services and initiatives that typical municipalities do not, e.g. free public transit,
festivals and events, and beautification projects. These initiatives are on a scale far
larger than their residential tax base\textsuperscript{36}. As Municipal Officer Informant #1 stated: “Unlike
other towns, we need to have animation in the village, we need to have better
landscaping, we need to have more parks, we need to have stuff that other communities
wouldn’t even think of funding” (July, 2015). Raising local tax rates to fund these
initiatives is both unfair to the local residents and politically disastrous. Instead, these
initiatives needed to have another funding source.

In 1987 the provincial government created the Municipal and Regional District
Tax (MRDT)\textsuperscript{37}. The MRDT is a hotel tax that communities could opt into\textsuperscript{38}. The tax allows
the municipality or regional district to impose up to an additional 3\%\textsuperscript{39} on the existing

\textsuperscript{35} Lands for lifts
\textsuperscript{36} Similar issues to creating a sewage system and other key infrastructure (see section 4.3.2)
\textsuperscript{37} This was after the RMOW council petitioned for the tax. Presenting a document called Whistler
Inc., which highlighted the single-industry realities of resort communities.
\textsuperscript{38} A general hotel room tax was introduced to British Columbia in 1971 through the Hotel Room
Tax Act. The act imposed a general 5\% ad valorem tax across the province on all short-term
accommodations. In 1981 the tax was amended to have a two-tier system, 6\% tax on rooms
which were $50 or below and an 8\% tax on rooms above $50. Finally, in 1987 it was raised to 8\%
which it is still currently.
\textsuperscript{39} Originally communities could impose up to 2\%. It was changed to 3\% in 2015.
hotel room tax. Whistler was the first community to adopt the MRDT in 1988. Fundamentally, the MRDT is a form of tax exporting, which means that it taxes people outside of the community's population\(^{40}\). The finances raised through the MRDT are earmarked for tourism marketing and projects. The money is stipulated to "assist local communities to operate convention centers and other tourism amenities...[the MRDT] will help communities in developing the facilities necessary to become year-round destination resorts" (Couvelier, 1987, May 21). The Ministry of Finance in 2014 described the MRDT as a way to: "raise revenue for local tourism marketing, programs and projects" (2014, p.2).

Beyond the demand for a new financial tool\(^{41}\), where did it come from? The RMOW Council recognized they were not the only ones to face these fundamental issues; other tourism communities must have the same problems. The council went on a fact-finding mission to a variety of ski communities in the Western US. The found their US counterparts were granted home rule, which gave them the ability to impose and collect their own taxes. Aspen, Vail, Park City, and Jackson are some examples of ski communities that impose additional sales taxes. The Whistler council returned from their trip and presented the provincial government with their findings. "We wanted [the tax] on everything, but the politicians said 'well we don’t want you to have to pay it on children’s shoes or meals under $7.' So they restricted it to the direct thing—hotels" (Municipal Officer Informant #1, July, 2015). The MRDT was politically favored at both the municipal and provincial levels. For the municipal council, it is easier to sell a tax-exporting initiative to your constituents\(^{42}\). For the provincial government, it was critical that the MRDT was structured as an additive tax that communities could choose to levy—this did not reduce their tax base (Municipal Officer Informant #1, July, 2015).

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\(^{40}\) The statutory incidence of the tax falls on people outside of the community; however, the economic incidence of the tax may in-fact remain in the community (through hotel owners).

\(^{41}\) Vancouver, the province’s largest city hosted the World Fair: Expo ’86. The fair generated international attention to the region and its tourism industry.

\(^{42}\) There are still valid equity concerns because tax is only for accommodation, i.e. only one sector is taxed but the rest benefit
A temporary moratorium was placed on the MRDT between 1994 and 1999 which prevented new communities from joining the program. During this time only seven designated recipients\textsuperscript{43} were participating in the program and were eligible for renewals.

The MRDT has several lasting effects on Whistler and the province. It provided Whistler (and any subsequent community that adopted the tax) with more financial autonomy and a tool to deal with those unique financial problems. The Minister of Finance at the time—Mr. Couvelier—described the MRDT as a way that: “communities [can] assume more responsibility for developing their local economies” (Couvelier, 1987, May 21). The RMOW fact-finding trip marked an important shift in Whistler's identity, aligning itself with other resort communities (instead of other provincial municipalities)\textsuperscript{44}. As a policy incubator, Whistler proved useful in a new way. Because it is at the forefront of development and faced with unique challenges, Whistler helped the province identify a solution to a problem it did not know it had. As one provincial officer informant describes: "We are fortunate to have Whistler, Whistler goes through the industry hiccups sooner than everyone else because they are further advanced" (Provincial Officer Informant #2, July 2015).

### 4.4. Phase 3: Path Dependence

![Figure 7: Phase 3 of the Resort Governance Evolutionary Pathway](image)

\textsuperscript{43} City of Prince Rupert, City of Victoria, District of Oak Bay, District of Saanich, Resort Municipality of Whistler, Tourism Vancouver, and the Town of Smithers

\textsuperscript{44} The RMOW Council fact-finding trips would become a tradition
The evolutionary pathway has been forged and is now locked-in. This third phase—path dependence—describes the reinforcing mechanisms that make this path resistant to change. In BC, the resort development pathway is locked into the Whistler model. This research identified two critical events that helped re-inforce the current pathway: (1) the creation of the Mountain Resort Association Act; and (2) the development of the Resort Municipality Initiative. These events were driven by the reverberation of past decisions, and in turn helped to further entrench the evolutionary pathway.

### 4.4.1. Mountain Resort Association Act

What this legislation does is level the playing field for mountain resort communities outside Whistler and allow those communities to share in the success of Whistler. What this bill does is create, potentially, more Whistlers in British Columbia. It will extend the same local governance, service provision and resort association benefits enjoyed by Whistler to other resort communities and developers. This legislation, unique in North America, will further enhance B.C.’s international reputation as the only area on the continent where mountain resorts can still be developed. The new act will allow other mountain resorts access to the benefits that have been given to Whistler under the existing Resort Municipality of Whistler Act. (Clark, 1995, April 18)

The Mountain Resort Association Act (MRA-Act) was intended to provide local resort communities with the same governance tools that were afforded to Whistler through the RMOW-Act. It marks the first time that Whistler’s governance model has been exported.\(^{45}\)

The MRA-Act has six critical components:

1. Closer provincial supervision, the minister is granted the authority to appoint one alderman to the municipal council, and the first bylaws must also be approved by the minister.
2. Less stringent referendum requirements. Mountain resort areas are exempt from sections of the Municipal Act.

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\(^{45}\) Previously only the land-use policies were exported through CASP
3. Broadened development cost charges, unlike traditional municipalities Mountain Resort Areas can require developers to pay a development cost charge to help fund initiatives such as employee housing

4. Broadened development permit powers, giving the resort government the power to have greater control over the particular form and character of buildings and structures.

5. Creation of a resort association for the purpose to promote, facilitate and encourage the development, maintenance and operation of the resort promotion area.

6. The resort association has the authority to levy fees from its members, providing the associations with financial security for operating.

However similar the MRA-Act and the RMOW-Act are, there are several non-replicable elements from Whistler. Most importantly, Whistler was infused with large sums of public money, the money came during critical moments in Whistler's development which allowed the community to develop a critical mass. This level of public funds is not available to other resort communities in the province. Instead, these communities must leverage the tools provided through the MRA-Act and lessons learned from Whistler help create more financial security and circumvent some of the pitfalls of Whistler.

4.4.1.1 Background Politics

Similar to the RMOW-Act, the MRA-Act was developed to service one resort—Sun Peaks Resort. Mike Harcourt, the NDP Premier of the province strove to create stronger economic ties in Asia. On April 21st, 1993 in Tokyo, Harcourt announced that the government signed a Master Development Agreement with Nippon Cable (a

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46 Whistler has a similar authority granted
47 Whistler has successfully leveraged this power to ensure a cohesive aesthetic throughout the municipality.
48 Whistler has successfully leveraged this power to ensure a cohesive aesthetic throughout the municipality.
49 The precise wording in the legislation is identical to the 1979 amendment to the RMOW-Act: "An association may make bylaws that may include provisions for levying of assessments on members" (Mountain Resort Association Act; Resort Municipality of Whistler Act).
50 Described in section 4.3.2
51 At the time it was known at Todd Mountain.
Japanese company) to develop Sun Peaks Resort (CitySpaces, 2005). The goal was to provide Sun Peaks with the same tools that Whistler was afforded. With this political pressure, Provincial Officer Informant #1 remembers working on the legislation:

Anytime there was a hiccup came along I would have to encourage my staff to give way a bit because there was this *inexorable force* moving forward. (July, 2015)

The political forces helped policy makers export the Whistler model through the MRA-Act.

### 4.4.2. British Columbia’s Commitment to Resort Development

Tourism is another sector that is critical to the government's B.C. Heartlands Economic Strategy. By 2010, your government wants to see our tourism industry more than double in size...B.C.'s four-season resorts are an enormous economic asset and represent a significant opportunity for British Columbians throughout our heartlands. (Campagnolo, 2003, February 11)

Resort communities are a central component to the aggressive provincial tourism strategy. In the same speech, the Lieutenant-Governor announced that a Resort Task Force was created, to help develop new resort specific policies and programs. Shortly after, in 2004, the Resorts Development Branch was established under the Land and Water BC to act as a one-stop shop for resort developers. Finally, in 2005 the All Season Resort Policy was established to be an umbrella policy for the Commercial Alpine Ski Policy (CASP) and provide non-ski resorts with similar land-use policies afforded through the CASP. Through these initiatives the provincial government became more deeply committed to developing its tourism industry.

The Government’s Heartlands Economic Strategy sought to revitalise dwindling economies. For communities in rural BC, the strategy echoed the words of a former Premier Bennett's province building campaign. It aimed at developing rural areas in the province using use the "municipality as a vehicle for economic development" (Policy

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53 The community economies were previously dependent on traditional resource extraction industries (Nepal and Jamal, 2011).
Informant #2). The Government’s commitment to doubling the size of the tourism industry\(^{54}\) was announced on the coat-tails of Vancouver winning the 2010 Olympic Bid.

### 4.4.2.1 Resort Task Force

The Resort Task Force was comprised of fifteen members from industry, local government and First Nations\(^{55}\). The Task Force helped the government develop a particular vision of how to expand BC’s resort industry. Specifically, its goal was to:

Develop business opportunities, attract investment to existing and new resorts, grow the industry and create local jobs—all while continuing to protect the natural beauty that underlies almost all of British Columbia’s tourism. (Resort Task Force, 2004, p. 1)

Operating for one year, the Resort Task Force examined the current state of resort communities in the province and drew from select case studies locally and elsewhere. The Task Force produced four major reports:

1. Transitions: Planning, Servicing, and Local Government in BC’s Resort Communities;
3. Best Practices Guide: Creating Resort Partnerships with First Nations; and,

These reports became foundational pieces for the provincial resort strategy and would shape the vision of resort development in the future.

### 4.4.2.2 Mountain Resorts Branch

The British Columbia Resort and Investment Office would act as the one-window office for the developer to explicitly scope and articulate the project...A single provincial office will assist the shepherding of proposed projects through the appropriate steps. (Resort Task Force, 2004, p. 21)

The creation of the Mountain Resorts Branch came from the recommendation of the Resort Task Force.\(^{56}\) Acting as a liaison between the provincial government and

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\(^{54}\) This would later be scaled back to doubling tourism revenue and the timeline was extended to 2015.

\(^{55}\) A significant number of members of the Task Force had either directly or indirectly been involved with Whistler
resort developers, Provincial Officer Informant #3 described the branch’s function as a "one-stop business unit, a single point of contact" (July, 2015). The strength of the branch came from its ability to reduce the bureaucracy that a developer would need to navigate and provide specialised expertise in resort development in BC.

4.4.2.3 All-Season Resort Policy

The necessary policy to create all season resort development should be developed by LWBC [Land and Water BC] and suggest revising the Commercial Alpine Ski Policy into an All-Season Resort Policy to encompass a broad range of resort types with a focus on reducing and preventing land use conflicts with existing resorts. (Resort Task Force, 2004, p. 25)

The All-Season Resort Policy (ASRP) was introduced in 2005, using the Commercial Alpine Ski Policy (CASP) as a model. It sought to broaden CASP’s scope to encompass non-ski areas. Specifically, the policy examined applications in six additional resort categories: (1) Mountain, (2) Marine, (3) Agri-Tourism, (4) Golf, (5) Health and Wellness, and (6) Casino. The subsequent policy afforded these forms of resort development similar land-use policies given through CASP. However, as yet only the mountain resort section (CASP) has been fully developed.

4.4.3.1 Resort Municipality Initiative

Over a decade after the Mountain Resort Municipality Act was created the provincial government introduced the Resort Municipality Initiative (RMI)57. Al Raine, mayor of Sun Peaks Resort and former Provincial Ski Coordinator, described the initiative as "one of the most innovative tourism programs ever" (as cited in Ministry of Jobs, Tourism and Skills Training, 2012). The RMI is three-pronged: (1) broadens the definition of resorts, (2) introduces an innovative revenue-sharing model, and (3) provides the legal mechanisms to incorporate without an existing population base.

The Mountain Resort Association Act only applied to mountain resort communities before 2007. In contrast, the RMI amended the Act to read: Resort

56 The branch was created in 2005, originally named the Resort Development Branch which operated under the Ministry Land and Water BC, then under the Ministry of Tourism, Sports and the Arts. Finally, it was brought into the Ministry of Forests, Lands, and Natural Resources and renamed the Mountain Resorts Branch.
57 The RMI was introduced through Bill 11, which amended various existing pieces of legislation.
Association Act, thereby broadening its mandate to any community where tourism is the major economic driver. The government identified thirteen resort oriented communities in the province: Fernie, Golden, Harrison Hot Springs, Invermere, Kimberley, Osoyoos, Radium Hot Springs, Revelstoke, Rossland, Tofino, Ucluelet, Valemount, and Whistler which met this standard.

The second prong of the RMI included a unique revenue-sharing program in which communities receive a portion of the local hotel tax revenue collected by the provincial government. Specifically, from the eight percentage points collected through a hotel tax, participating communities can reclaim between one to four points. The exact amount returned depends on the amount raised, and the overall number of accommodation units within the community. Once returned, the funds are earmarked for tourism programming (including infrastructure, amenities, and events). In 2016 the provincial government returned $10.5 million to the fourteen communities through this program. Only communities designated through the Local Government Act as Resort Regions, Resort Municipalities, or Mountain Resort Municipalities are eligible for the revenue sharing program.

The third prong of the RMI provides the legislative mechanisms to incorporate an uninhabited area as a municipality. Through the Local Government Act, which read:

Despite section 8, in the case of an area that is not a mountain resort improvement district, the minister may recommend to the Lieutenant Governor in Council incorporation of the residents of the area into a new mountain resort municipality if the minister is satisfied that a person has entered into an agreement with the government with respect to developing alpine ski lift operations, year-round recreational facilities and commercial overnight accommodation within the area.

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58 No eligibility requirements were ever developed by the Province. This became a point of contention and later years.
59 Sun Peaks eventually joined the list as the fourteenth eligible RMI community in 2011.
60 See Appendix G for formula.
61 The communities must also collect the optional Municipal Regional District Tax (MRDT).
62 This third prong has been extremely contentious. West Kootenay Community Ecosociety petitioned the Supreme Court of British Columbia that the pith and substance dramatically changed between the 2007 legislation and a 2012 amendment (see Appendix H). Arguing that the 2007 piece of legislation did not give the legislative authority to the Crown to incorporate a municipality without an existing population; while the Crown submitted that it did. The Supreme Court's verdict sided with the Crown. Currently, only Jumbo Glacier has been incorporated as a resort municipality under this 2012 amendment.
As long as the Minister was satisfied that the area has sufficient ski lift operations, recreational facilities and accommodation units either established or outlined in an approved Master Plan Agreement, they may incorporate the community as a Mountain Resort Municipality. The ability to incorporate an uninhabited area seems to reverberate the Instant Town Act of 1965, demonstrating the endurance of previous ideas in the evolutionary pathway.

The driving force behind the Resort Municipality Initiative was the 2010 Olympics, and Whistler was steering the ship. Since the development of the Municipal Regional District Tax (see section 4.3.5) Whistler had argued for a sales tax. It subsequently leveraged the Olympics to get the revenue-sharing program in place (Municipal Officer Informant #3, July 2015). Politically, the revenue-sharing program was desirable because the tax money was returned to the communities before it was accounted for in the province’s consolidated revenue: "which is much better because it secures the money for the [community]. It’s more like [the community’s] money, rather than [the government’s] money (Provincial Officer Informant #1, July 2015).

4.5. Phase 4: Potential Path Breaking

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63 Similar to many resort communities in the United States who have ‘home rule’, which allows them to impose and collect taxes. Municipalities in BC do not have the ability to do this.
Though the research findings indicate the BC’s resort development pathway is still locked into the Whistler Model; it also identified several potential unlocking forces. Outside of the scope of this research, it is important to highlight their possible implications on the evolutionary pathway.

4.5.1. Resort Municipality Initiative Changes from a Revenue-Sharing Program to a Grant Program

In 2010, the BC government introduced the Harmonized Sales Tax (HST), which combined the Provincial Sales Tax (PST) and the General Sales Tax (GST). The tax system in the province was restructured, and the hotel room tax was eliminated. Because the Resort Municipality Initiative revenue-sharing program was based on the hotel room tax, it became nullified. To compensate for this disruption, the provincial government changed the funding model from a revenue-sharing model to a grant program. Instead of being strictly performance based, the grants have remained constant at $10.5 million each year. There are significant budgetary differences between a revenue-sharing and grant programs. Revenue-sharing funds flow in and back out of the government's books without being captured as part of the government's overall budget; while grants are accounted for in the government's budget. This difference has made the RMI funds much more susceptible to budgetary cuts and general political forces. Ski/Resort Policy Informant #1 half-jokingly highlights the risk as “[Changing it to a grant is] bureaucratic speak for ‘we can claw back this program’” (July, 2015). This foundational change has placed the entire program at risk of other forces and sub-sequentially reduces a community's financial security and ability to compete within a global marketplace.

Whistler has already begun to take mitigating steps towards disruptive forces. Developing an Economic Partnership Initiative (EPI) whose mandate is: to expand the former Resort Municipality Initiative (RMI) Oversight Committee's role to include a broader economic planning mandate*. The committee commissioned a widely cited study of Whistler's economic planning which found that its economic activities generate $1.37 million in tax revenue daily. Through the work of the EPI, Whistler has begun to

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64 In 2013 the HST was removed, and the PST, GST and subsequent Hotel Room Tax were all reinstated; however, the revenue-sharing model was not reinstated. The RMI funding continued being delivered through a grant program.
65 The division of funds across the communities is still based on performance.
build the foundation for its case of why it should continue to receive these funds from the provincial government. Other resort communities may follow this trend.

4.5.2. Potential Influences of Climate Change

The effects of climate change have potentially devastating impacts on the provincial ski industry (see: Scott and McBoyle, 2007). Inconsistent snowfall has been a major issue for resort communities, snow recreation is their primary resource (see: McDougall, 2016). If the snow disappears so does their raison d'être. Modern resource extraction industries like forestry, energy, and mining have moved away from the single-industry town model in favour of a no-town model. The no-town model can reduce the ecological footprint of the resource extraction activities, lessen the economic and social disruption in case of closures (Markey and Heisler, 2011). The Whistler model assumes the recreational resources will be there, climate change may fundamentally alter that assumption.

Secondly, under the All-Season Resort Policy there is no requirement for proponents to include any climate change information in their proposal, master plan, or environmental assessment review: "Some these proposals have no climate change information submitted with the proposal, which is ludicrous" (Ski/Resort Policy Informant #2, July 2015). As climate change has the potential to affect resorts dramatically, mitigation strategies should be considered in their approval process.

4.5.3. Evolving Role of Aboriginal Groups in Land-Use Decisions

Aboriginal groups across Canada have struggled to reclaim sovereignty rights that they inhabited before western colonisation (Williams and Gill, 2017). In British Columbia, where a disproportionately low number of historical and modern treaties are in place, this issue is especially relevant.

Concurrent to Premier Campbell's Heartlands Economic Strategy in 2003, the Premier launched the ‘New Relationship’ in 2003. The New Relationship sought to address past mistakes and redefine the relationship between the provincial government and the First Nation groups. As the Lieutenant-Governor, Iona Campagnolo, describes in her Speech from the Throne:
The future will be forged in partnership with First Nations – not in denial of their history, heritage and culture. It will be won in recognition of First Nations’ constitutional rights and title – not lost for another generation because we failed to act…It will be earned through reconciliation and mutual respect. It will be built with bold new approaches that will materially improve First Nations’ quality of life – before and after treaties are concluded. (Campagnolo, 2003, February 11)

The influence of the New Relationship spanned other initiatives and policies. For instance, the third major volume published by the Resort Task Force was titled: “Best Practices Guide: Creating Resort Partnerships with First Nations.” The guide is designed for First Nations and/or resort developers/operators who wish to partner.

Within the provincial and federal courts, a series of landmark decisions were made. The rulings provided aboriginal groups with greater control over land-use decisions. In 2014, the Supreme Court of Canada ruled in favour of the Tsilhqot’in Nation. The Tsilhqot’in ruling provides additional clarity over aboriginal title, and states that no activities can be conducted on the land without the affected group’s consent. Previously, the affected groups required consultation and accommodation.66 The role of aboriginal groups in land-use decisions is becoming increasingly significant.67

A fundamental assumption in resort land-use policy is that the ski infrastructure which creates value in the village area. Exemplified in the policy’s ‘perform and reward’ model of land allocation, or statements such as: "The people who put the investment in the lifts need to control the land at the bottom" (Ski/Resort Policy Informant #1, July 2015). Examining land-use decisions through a traditional-use lens will likely alter the assumption the land has no (or little) inherent value—that the value is added through the infrastructure. This could become a contentious piece moving forward as aboriginal groups are incorporated in these decisions.

66 This was enforced by the 2004 Haida Supreme Court of Canada ruling.
67 The Supreme Court of Canada heard a case in late 2016 brought by the Ktunaxa Nation concerning the Jumbo Glacier Resort development. Specifically, the ruling may affect how land-use decisions impact aboriginal group’s freedom of religion. No ruling has been made.
68 In 2014 the BC Supreme Court ruled that the Province did not fulfil consultation duty with Squamish and Lil’wat First Nations concerning the implementation of Whistler’s Official Community Plan, which in turn repealed the plan.
4.5.4. Unintended Consequences of the Municipal Development Model

There are concerns about the equity of who receives a portion of the $10.5 million in RMI funding. Currently to be eligible to receive RMI funding the community designated through the Local Government Act as Resort Regions, Resort Municipalities, or Mountain Resort Municipalities; only the Minister can select areas/communities to be incorporated as one of these entities. There are no eligibility requirements, the thirteen communities identified in 2007 are nearly the same a decade later.²⁹

Other tourism-centred municipalities such as Parksville, Qualicum, Big White and Kelowna are currently seeking resort municipality status (Harding, 2013; Sieben, 2013, October 2). Not being eligible to receive RMI funding can put these communities at a competitive disadvantage when competing amongst themselves. For example, in 2012 Kelowna lost the bid to host Ironman Canada; Whistler successfully won the bid largely through their ability to invest RMI funding. The RMI funding was leveraged to create more economic opportunities for the community.

Other non-incorporated communities are seeking to incorporate as a resort municipality, which can pose unique challenges. Provincial Officer Informant #3 remembers when the communities would approach government:

Do you mean the resort municipality initiative? Or do you actually want to incorporate as a resort municipality? Do you think your community is mature enough to take that step and take on all the functions as a municipal government...That's the rub that I have with folks that are interested in getting into the RMI funding. They said we need to have a municipality, so make us a municipality. To what purpose? How will it benefit anyone other than the resort developer who will benefit where you are putting the money back in. (July, 2015)

Assuming the responsibilities of self-governance is an ineffective solution, unfortunately, because there are no other criteria measures it is the only avenue for communities to petition for RMI funding.

²⁹ Sun Peaks joined in 2011.
Chapter 5. Discussion

The findings of this study suggest that resort development in BC is locked into a particular pathway. This pathway, operating in a complex environment, has been diligently and purposively shaped over a long period. Actors have successfully been able to leverage a series of forces to create this pathway strategically. Once created, the pathway has benefited from several reinforcing lock-in mechanisms that have made it resistant to change. Finally, the research identifies several potential unlocking forces— their influence has not yet been fully realised. This discussion, drawing from specific examples from the previous chapter, will highlight how these forces were strategically used to shape the evolutionary pathway.

5.1. Path Creation

As Garud and Karnøe (2001) explain, during the path creation process actors leverage a series of available forces to shape a pathway purposively. To do this successfully, agents exercise judgements about time, relevance structures, and objects.

5.1.1. Using Time as Resource

An actor’s ability to call upon time as a resource can manifest in several ways. The research identified three primary methods in which actors mobilise time: (1) evoking images of the future in strategic ways; (2) calling upon history; (3) leveraging current and forthcoming events.

Whistler has benefited from having a strong vision of its future. The Silver Book, created before the municipality was incorporated, is described as a blueprint for all of the community’s subsequent community plans. Elements from the Silver Book such as limits to growth, a ‘human-scale’ development, and a vibrant village centre have been ingrained in the Whistler model and the community’s identity. One resident described the bed-unit cap\(^70\) as: “I have three beliefs in life: death, taxes, and the 52,500 bed unit cap” (as cited in Horner, 2000). Obviously, this is an exaggeration, but it highlights the power

\(^{70}\) The manifestation of limits-to-growth
of the vision in the community. The vision has transcended the community and has embedded itself into the Whistler model. These key elements of the Whistler vision are now seen in other resorts across the province.

Mobilising time is not always forward looking, sometimes agents evoke history in strategic and deliberate ways. Invoking past events was a key strategy used by the NDP when crafting and employing the Cypress narrative. Linking the failures of various ski developments to the current government, suggesting negligence and incompetence was a powerful tool for the NDP. The Cypress narrative allowed the NDP to shape the development of Whistler so that its governance structure aligned with the party's political ideologies. In this instance, the NDP successfully used a historical event to shape the evolutionary pathway.

Finally, time can be used by leveraging current and forthcoming events. Leveraging the attention these events brought and creating a sense of urgency—all to further their agenda. British Columbia has hosted two mega-events: The Expo 86 World Fair and the Vancouver 2010 Winter Olympics. In both instances, Whistler successfully leveraged the provincial government to develop a new tourism funding initiative. In 1987, drawing from the success of Expo '86, Whistler put forward a proposal to the provincial government that would eventually lead to the creation of the Municipal Regional District Tax. In 2007 the Province launched the innovative revenue sharing program—the Resort Municipality Initiative—which shares a portion of the provincial hotel tax. One municipal officer informant recalls:

We wanted additional financial tools, now the RMI funds. We used the Olympics to get them (Municipal Officer Informant #3, July, 2015).

Gill and Williams (2011) describe how the RMOW used the urgency and momentum of the Olympic Games to help address outstanding issues in the community, such as: creating a $50 million Legacy Fund to help support the future management of the sport venues; obtaining additional Crown Land from the BC government for affordable housing; and the implementation of many components of the Whistler2020 plan (Municipal Officer Informant #3, July 2015). These mega-events were strategically leveraged by the community to help them enact their will.
5.1.2. Spanning and Reframing Relevance Structures

The ability to traverse the boundary of relevance structures has been invaluable to actors shaping the resort development pathway in British Columbia. The skill involves expanding an existing set of practices and meanings—relevance structures—to purposively enact their will. Positioning a problem or solution within a different framework has allowed for the adoption of novel and innovative solutions.

Skiing has been criticised in the province and elsewhere of being an elitist activity, catering only to the rich and famous (Ski/Resort Policy Informant #1, July 2015). When the NDP—a left-leaning—government was in office during the 1970's they made it clear that resort development was not a priority for the party. Instead of contesting these claims, the industry was dramatically reframed through a resource lens. Although the research did not uncover the particular actors who pushed for the use of a recreational resource framework within BC; the effects have been clearly observed. Before incorporating Whistler in 1975, two influential studies conducted in BC widened understanding of the importance and potential of natural resources as recreation and tourism capital—especially in and around Whistler. Positioning associated resort development through a resource lens provided the NDP government with the ability to incorporate these activities into its general mandate.

In 1975, the provincial politics shifted to a left-of-centre So-Cred government. The relationship between Whistler and the province was shaped by the NDP; this was dramatically changed by the So-Cred government. Through several key amendments to the RMOW-Act, much of the provincial oversight was returned to the municipality. This again demonstrates importance of nimbleness in reframing issues and opportunities to match with shifting political ideologies. Ironically, this tactic proved so successful that Whistler became a staple of the So-Cred party.71

To attract investment attention from the US, Whistler and the provincial government framed BC as an uncomplicated place to develop a ski resort. It was not bogged down in a litigious environment. Instead, the province was promoted as being open for business. More so, when Aspen ski resort requested changes to the Railway

71 There is a reference to a Vancouver newspaper, circa 1982, which has an editorial cartoon that depicts a drawing of Bill Bennett (BC Premier and leader of the So-Cred party) on a rocking chair with the caption: "Whistler's Mother" (as cited in Barnett, 2015, September 6).
Act and RMOW-Act, these amendments were pushed through. BC successfully contrasted itself between the US as a safe place for investment: "Compared to the States, it was like heaven" (Ski/Resort Policy Informant #1, July, 2015).

Identity is a central question for many resort communities: are they a resort or community? This issue is central to community funding, planning, and politics—where should the community's priorities lie? Whistler had been too busy rapidly growing in the late 1970s and early 1980s to tackle this issue. As the resort and community matured concurrently, this question became increasingly pressing. Whistler's council sought to reframe Whistler's identity—moving it from a community in BC to a top international resort. By this time, it had developed the capacity to validate this claim, but importantly the council shifted its focus beyond BC. To help them do so, they travelled and toured other ski-resorts in the Western US—evaluating best practices. These familiarisation trips became a tradition for the Whistler council. In turn, it helped reshape their ability to position where Whistler was and what opportunities Whistler had.

The ability to reframe and span relevance structures has allowed actors to shape and protect their evolutionary pathway. Specifically, it allowed actors to leverage socio-political movements, weather political changes, and shape identities. These actors strategically shifted and expanded existing practices and beliefs to further their agendas.

5.1.3. Translating Objects

To enact their will, actors often translate or endogenize objects. Objects are defined as the “physical manifestation of human effort to tame and shape nature” (Garud and Karnøe, 2001). Within this research, objects can be understood as policies, pieces of legislation, and models. Instead of reframing or spanning understanding, the actors take existing objects from elsewhere and translate them for their use. This was found to be the most pervasive fashion for actors in shaping BC’s resort policy evolutionary pathway.

Many of the foundational policies were borrowed from other places. The Cypress model employed a lease-develop-purchase method of Crown land development. This

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72 See Gill and Williams (2011) for a description of Whistler's growth machine period.
73 One of the opportunities discussed with the creation of the Municipal Regional District Tax, a direct outcome of a familiarisation trip.
policy was originally developed in Peace River, BC in 1963 to curb real-estate speculation. It proved disastrous when adopted to ski development. Whistler borrowed a perform-and-reward model from the US Forest Service Policy, this then influenced the creation of the Commercial Alpine Ski Policy in 1984 and finally the All-Season Resort Policy in 2004.

The governance structure of the RMOW-Act of 1975 was heavily influenced by the Instant Towns Act of 1965. The RMOW-Act would later influence the (Mountain) Resort Association Act and the amendment to the Local Government Act in 2007. This subsequently provided the provincial government with authority to incorporate uninhabited areas—creating instant towns. Each of these policies built off of one another with a clear thread connecting them all.

Neither the TIDSA and MURB policies were created specifically with the intent to develop Whistler, but were translated to help develop the critical mass in Whistler. TIDSA was partially designed from the onset to build tourism infrastructure and capacity throughout the country. Whistler successfully translated and leveraged these funds to gain a better bargaining position with developers—resulting in being able to realize its vision of a resort community environment. The MURB program was designed to provide a tax shelter for investors; however, it was translated to Whistler to help develop a critical mass of infrastructure in the village. Neither program was designed for Whistler; instead, they were translated by a series of enterprising actors to help them achieve their goals.

Finally, the provincial government translated two resort funding schemes to fit its legislative context. Both the MRDT and the RMI funding were heavily influenced by resorts in the United States. Unlike in the US, Canadian municipalities do not have ‘home rule’\textsuperscript{74}, therefore the burden remains on the province to translate the effects of this reality to a BC context. Increasingly, BC resorts are seeking a more equitable and reliable source of funding from governments to help address the increasing inequitable equitable tax burden local residents are obliged to pay for services shared with tourists.

\textsuperscript{74} They cannot enact legislation to levy their taxes.
Actors successfully shaped the BC resort pathway through translating policies, expanding and reframing common understandings, and employing time as a resource. These actors mindfully changed the trajectory of the pathway.

5.2. Path Dependence

We ourselves are both actors and spectators in the drama of existence. (Bohr, 1948)

There is a juxtaposition embedded within the evolutionary pathway model. The contrast lies between the notion of path creation and path dependence. While path creation emphasises the role of agency in shaping evolutionary pathways; path dependence describes the stickiness associated with pathways. This contradiction is rectified by reminding ourselves that organisational pathways are social constructs—they have never, nor will never, have a final character. Path dependence is not a deterministic phase governed by strict law; but instead, it can be understood as a restricting corridor where the range of available choices is limited (Sydow et al., 2009). Agency and decisions are still necessary and present in this phase; however, there is an increased incentive to continue the status-quo. Decisions that are outside of the range would be cataclysmic path-breaking choices. Path dependence posits that through several reinforcing mechanisms it becomes increasingly easier to continue in a particular pathway. The literature identified three lock-in mechanisms: structural, cognitive, and political. The research was only able to successfully identify structural and cognitive lock-ins—no political lock-ins were teased out. It is important to mention that these mechanisms often work in conjunction with one another, blurring their taxonomic boundaries; therefore the political lock-ins may still be present.

Returning to the broader discussion of the distinction between path creation and path dependence, the research found that even during the path dependence phase actors were continuing to leverage forces to push their agenda. These forces were successfully used to create a sense of urgency and priority. For example, Sun Peaks benefited from intense political pressure from the Premier. While working on the piece of legislation, an informant described the political pressure as an "inexorable force". Policy makers decidedly chose to borrow from the Whistler model instead of creating something novel. The Whistler model was safe, worked well, and could be easily
translated to the rest of the country. The policy makers also leveraged that political force
to ensure that the piece of legislation would have a wider mandate than just Sun Peaks.

Similarly, the province’s commitment to resort development was driven by a
political force—doubling the tourism industry by 2015. Gordon Campbell—the Premier of
BC—concurrently created the Resort Task Force which was tasked to examine resort
best practices. The Resort Task Force furthered the cognitive lock-in of the Whistler
model and developed the structural components to help administer it. The creation of the
All-Season Resort Policy is directly attributed to a recommendation from the Resort Task
Force. The Policy can be understood as an expansion of the Commercial Alpine Ski
Policy, which is an adaption of Whistler’s lands-for-lifts. The creation of the Mountain
Resorts Branch is also directly attributed to a recommendation from the Resort Task
Force. The Mountain Resorts Branch became the organisational component to help
administer the All-Season Resort Policy and help solidify the organisational ties and
structural lock-in of the Whistler model.

Finally, Vancouver’s successful bid for the 2010 Winter Olympics became the
engine of the Resort Municipality Initiative. Whistler successfully leveraged the attention
of the Olympics to establish a unique municipal revenue stream for the community.
While across the province the RMI was used to further entrench the province in the
Whistler Model cognitive lock-in. 13 other communities became resort municipalities, all
eligible to receive the same benefits that were only previously granted to Whistler and
Sun Peaks. One of these many advantages was that it allowed for unpopulated areas to
incorporate as municipalities, which of course harkens back to how Whistler was
incorporated and the Instant Towns Act previous to that.

The path dependence phase is still dependent on actors leveraging forces—we
are not passive observers. Agents are still able to enact their will; however, in enacting
their will, they are further propagating the current evolutionary pathway. Perhaps
because of pathway endurance or because of increasing returns, continuing down the
current well-trodden trail appears to be more beneficial to actors; until it’s not. In the path
dependence phase, past events reverberate through time and can be heard in every
decision made. It proves that history is woven into the present and therefore matters.
Chapter 6. Conclusions

6.1. Summary of Findings

Drawing from a theoretical foundation of evolutionary economic geography and a path creation theory lens, this research sought to understand how resort governance systems emerge and evolve. Informed by a literature review, key informant interviews, and archival research, a case study was undertaken to illustrate how a system of resort governance was developed and changed in British Columbia between 1975 and 2015. Examining the driving forces and mechanisms of emergence, change and endurance. Specifically, it examined the creation and influence of the ‘Whistler model' in the province.

Exploring several 'critical moments' in the province's resort governance evolutionary pathway, the research found the trajectory was purposively directed by several key individuals and collectives. These actors were able to successfully leverage numerous exogenous and endogenous forces to help them enact their will. The evolutionary process also benefited from several structural realities, such as the Resort Municipality of Whistler Act. Beyond the additional powers granted to the municipality through the Act, it provided the province with a safe space to innovate and test ideas—the provincial ski policy incubator. Many of the provincial policies were first developed and tested in this safe space, which allowed them to mature and become more resistant to outside influences. The knowledge transfer from Whistler to the rest of the province is a critical element of BC’s resort governance story. The research found that past decisions often reverberate through time and can influence the present. Faint elements that influenced the Whistler model, such as the Instant Towns Act, have recently come into the foreground of policy. Despite not being used in its traditional resource extraction role, the Instant Towns Act of 1965 is very present in the province’s resort municipality initiative in 2007 and even more so in its amendment in 2012. History matters.

Despite Garud, Kumaraswamy, and Karnøe’s (2010) concern of combining path dependence and path creation—by way of mixing ontologies; it proved to be a fruitful model for analysis. The research found the role of agency was at the heart of every critical moment; however, those agents were working within a structural environment
largely dictated by past decisions. At times agents strategically employed the past, present and future to enact their will; they were still bound by the present contextual realities. Path dependence and path creation were shown to complement one another in this research.

6.2. Recommendations for Further Research

This study prompts new lines of inquiry. Possible avenues for further research are outlined below:

- Re-examine the relationship between Whistler’s evolutionary pathway and the provincial evolutionary pathway through a co-evolutionary perspective. Perhaps drawing from other elements of General Darwinism or Complexity Theory.

- Elaborate on the use of separate and unique legislation to create ‘protected spaces’ for innovation and testing. Are these safe spaces used elsewhere in developing innovative governance structures? And if so, how?

- Provide an Indigenous lens to the discussion of resource and land use. This lens challenges a fundamental assumption of inherent value and value creation. What similarities and differences would this perspective have?

- Further, investigate the notion of a competitive disadvantage for resort communities to not have access to taxing rights. Broaden the perspective to include international resorts and their unique revenue streams.
References


Department of Municipal Affairs. (1970). *Regional development framework for the area between Squamish and Pemberton*. Victoria, BC.


## Appendix A. Interview Schedule

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Theme</th>
<th>Area of Inquiry</th>
<th>Questions</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Participant positioning</td>
<td>Biographic contextualization</td>
<td>How long had you been involved with the [organisation/community] before the [specific moment]?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Describe your role in the [relevant organisation/community] at the time?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Critical moment – identification and typology</td>
<td>Narrative account of events</td>
<td>How did the [specific moment] unfold?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Contextualize</td>
<td>What were other options being discussed at the time?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Lock in vs. Path creation</td>
<td>How was the [specific moment] situated within a broader context?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Do you feel that the moment was radical or incremental in nature? And how so?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Describe the difference, if any, before and after the moment.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Emergence, change and resilience</td>
<td>Structural</td>
<td>What were the forces driving the [specific moment]?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>---------------------------------</td>
<td>------------</td>
<td>-------------------------------------------------</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>How did these forces influence the moment?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agency</td>
<td></td>
<td>Were there any particular individuals or organisations involved in the [specific moment]? [if so] who/what were they?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>How did the actors negotiate the [previously identified] forces?</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>How did the key actors influence the [specific moment]? What tools, if any, did they employ?</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
## Appendix B. Key Informants

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Informant Background</th>
<th>Number of informants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Community Organization</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Municipal Government</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ski/Resort Policy</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Provincial Government</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Resort Planner</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL</strong></td>
<td><strong>13</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Appendix C: Typical Respondent Solicitation and Project Description

Dear [name of participant],

My name is Chris Sheppard and I am a Graduate Student in the Center for Tourism Policy and Research in the Department of Resource and Environmental Management at Simon Fraser University. My senior supervisor is Dr. Peter Williams and we are conducting research on the evolution of resort governance and development policies within British Columbia. Specifically, the research will examine three distinct policies (and their subsequent amendments): the Resort Municipality of Whistler Act, the (Mountain) Resort Associations Act, and the Resort Municipality Initiative. For each of these policies, the research will illustrate the forces surrounding their inception and any major amendments. Understanding the evolution of these policies may provide critical insight in crafting future strategies to develop and govern resilient tourism-based communities.

As part of this research, we will be conducting interviews with pertinent government officers, industry officials, and community stakeholders who were entrenched in resort development or governance during the critical evolutionary phases. You are being invited to take part in this research study because of your involvement with the resort policies in the province and/or you have been identified as a ‘key player’ in the evolution of the Whistler community.

The interviews will be approximately one hour in length per person, and will be conducted by myself, the principal investigator in this study. Participants will also be provided with a consent form that they will then be able to sign to make them aware of their rights to anonymity in the use of the interview data as well as confidentiality in the way in which the data are handled. This study will be conducted under the guidance of the Office of Research Ethics at Simon Fraser University.

We would like to invite you to take part of this research study. If you agree to take part, please respond to this email indicating so, and you will be contacted shortly to arrange the details.

My phone number is 778-386-xxx and my email address is xxx@sfu.ca. Should you have any questions, please do not hesitate to contact me, or Dr. Peter Williams at xxx@sfu.ca.

Sincerely,

Chris Sheppard
Master in Resource Management (MRM) Candidate
Centre for Tourism Policy and Research, School of Resource and Environmental Management
Simon Fraser University
Appendix D: Consent Form

Interview Consent Form
The Evolutionary Paths of Resort Development and Governance Policies: A case study of British Columbia from 1975 to 2015
Research Ethics Application Number: 2014s0534

Who is conducting the study? The Principal Investigator of this study is Chris Sheppard, a candidate for Master of Resource Management at Simon Fraser University (Faculty of Environment, School of Resource and Environmental Management). This research is being conducted as a degree requirement and the results will be made public. The research will be supervised by Dr. Peter Williams, from the school of Resource and Environmental Management at Simon Fraser University.

Why are we doing this study? The goal of this study is to understand how and why the provincial policies concerning resort development and governance evolved in British Columbia from 1975 to 2007. Resorts are quickly becoming a critical component of the provincial tourism economy. Since 2007 the Province has (re)invested over $72.5 million into resort communities. Whistler represents the largest and oldest resort community within the province, therefore it is paramount to understand the forces that shaped Whistler’s evolution to better understand the current state of resort development in the province. This research focuses on the creation and evolution of three separate policies: the Resort Municipality of Whistler Act, and the (Mountain) Resort Associations Act, and the Resort Municipality Initiative. You are being invited to take part in this research study because of your involvement with the resort policies in the province and/or you have been identified as a ‘key player’ in the evolution of the Whistler community. This information will help inform future resort policy and development decisions.

Your participation is voluntary. Your participation is voluntary. You have the right to refuse to participate in this study. If you decide to participate, you may still choose to withdraw from the study at any time.

What happens if you say “Yes, I want to be in the study”? You will take part in one private interview with the principal investigator. The primary investigator will ask you a series of open-ended questions about your opinions and experiences with the creation, enactment or evolution of resort policies in British Columbia. These questions may include questions about specific legislation, or broader political trends occurring in the province and nation. The interview is approximately 1-1.5 hours long and will be audio recorded with your permission, and later transcribed for analysis. These audio recordings and transcriptions will be kept confidential and will be stored on a hard drive locked in a cabinet when not in use. The audio-recordings will be destroyed immediately after they have been transcribed. The transcriptions will be
destroyed 2 years after the report is complete. I may contact you subsequently for clarification of the answers you provided.

☐ YES, I agree to be audio recorded during the interview

☐ No, I do not agree to be audio recorded

*Is there any way being in this study could be bad for you?* We do not think there is anything in this study that could harm you or be bad for you. Some of the questions we ask might upset you. Please let one of the study staff know if you have any concerns.

*What are the benefits of participating?* Results from this research may help inform future resort policy and development decisions. No one knows whether or not you will benefit from this study. There may or may not receive direct benefits from taking part in this study. We will not pay you for the time you take to be in this study.

*How will your privacy be maintained?* Your confidentiality will be respected to the best of my ability, and all risk to your privacy will be minimized. Communication by telephone or email are not guaranteed confidential. Information that discloses your identity will not be released without your consent unless required by law. All documents will be identified only by code number and stored on an external hard drive that will be locked in a cabinet when not in use. The code key will be kept separately from data in a locked cabinet. Recordings will be erased as soon as they are transcribed. The report and publications will not include any identifying information; however I may want to use direct quotes from the interview. These direct quotes will not be attributed directly to you but in some cases they could be indirectly linked to your identity. In such cases I will seek permission from you to use the quote prior to inclusion in the report. All data for this study will be deleted by December 31, 2018.

☐ YES, I agree to the use of direct quotations in any thesis or publication that comes of this research

☐ NO, I do not want anonymous quotations used in any publications

*What if I decide to withdraw my consent to participate?* You may withdraw from this study at any time without giving reasons. If you choose to enter the study and then decide to withdraw at a later time, all data collected about you during your enrolment in the study will be destroyed.

*Additional factors:* If you will be answering questions about your agency or organization and you feel the need to be granted permission from a supervisor, permission from the employer will be obtained before you are interviewed.
The results of this study will be reported in a graduate thesis and may also be published in journal articles and books. Additionally, I will offer an executive briefing, available by email, to participants. If you would like this briefing sent to you please check the box below and provide your email address.

☐ YES, I would like an executive summary of results

☐ YES, I would like a copy of the completed project

**Who can you contact if you have questions about the study?** If you have any inquires concerning the procedures, you may contact the principal investigator, Chris Sheppard (ctsheppa@sfu.ca, tel: 778-386-xxx), OR my supervisor Dr. Peter Williams (xxx@sfu.ca, tel: 778-782-xxx).

**Who can you contact if you have complaints or concerns about the study?** If you have any concerns about your rights as a research participant and/or your experiences while participating in this study, you may contact Dr. Jeffrey Toward, Director, Office of Research Ethics jtorward@sfu.ca or 778-782-6593

**Can I contact you at a future time?** Your information may be used by me for additional research and/or I may wish to ask you more questions on this or another topic. In either event I will need to contact you to discuss your participation. No information will be used for additional research without renewing your consent.

☐ YES, I agree to future contact

☐ NO, do not contact me

**Your Consent and signature.** Taking part in this study is entirely up to you. You have the right to refuse to participate in this study. If you decide to take part, you may choose to pull out of the study at any time without giving a reason and without any negative impact on your [for example, employment, class standing, access to further services from the community centre, day care, etc.].”

- Your signature below indicates that you have received a copy of this consent form for your own records.
- Your signature indicates that you consent to participate in this study.

___________________________________________________________
Participant Signature

Date (yyyy/mm/dd)
Printed Name of the Participant signing above

Participant Contact Information (If you indicated yes to future contact or wish to receive an executive summary)
Appendix E: Recreational Resource Map of the Squamish and Pemberton Area

Figure 9: Department of Municipal Affairs (1970)
## Appendix F: TIDSA Overview

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>LOCATION</th>
<th>FUNDING (FED./PROV. SHARE) AND TERM</th>
<th>PRIMARY OBJECTIVES</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NEWFOUNDLAND</td>
<td>$13.3m. (90/10), 1978-83</td>
<td>Facility upgrade to increase length of stay, number of visitors.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>PRINCE EDWARD ISLAND</td>
<td>Tourism Component: $10m., Comprehensive Development Plan, 1969-84</td>
<td>Facility upgrade, destination area approach, heritage attractions; tourism to be developed in harmony with the Island’s social and economic needs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NOVA SCOTIA</td>
<td>$13.8m. (80/20), 1977-82</td>
<td>Destination area development to create employment opportunities by extending tourist season, increasing number of visitors and expenditures/visitor throughout the province.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NEW BRUNSWICK</td>
<td>$14.7m. (80/20), 1975-80</td>
<td>To increase number of visitors and lengths-of-stay through improved resource planning and facility development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>QUEBEC</td>
<td>$76.0m. (60/40), 1978-83</td>
<td>Increase of information centres, improvement of Provincial Parks, development of special cultural and historic heritage projects to create attractions, destination areas.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ONTARIO</td>
<td>Tourism Component: $4.0m. (50/50), Economic Development Agreement</td>
<td>Facility and plant upgrade and development of destination areas to address tourism’s seasonality</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
and the changing travel markets.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Province</th>
<th>Amount and Time Period</th>
<th>Description</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>MANITOBA</td>
<td>$20.0 m (60/40), 1979-84</td>
<td>Establish programmes to enhance destination areas and to facilitate the establishment of non-governmental organizations in tourism industry.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>SASKATCHEWAN</td>
<td>Tourism Component: $11.5 m. (60/40), Multi-Sector Subsidiary Agreement for Qu-Apelle Valley 1974-84</td>
<td>Upgrade of facility and increase in destination area attractions to increase visitor numbers and lengths-of-stay.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ALBERTA</td>
<td>No TIDSAs signed</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>BRITISH COLUMBIA</td>
<td>$50.0 m. (50/50), 1978-83</td>
<td>Infrastructure upgrade, planning, destination area and ski resort development.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NORTHWEST TERRITORIES</td>
<td>Tourism Component: $600,000 (60/40), Community Economic Development Agreement 1979-81</td>
<td>Improve facilities to create destination area, enhance tourism activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>YUKON</td>
<td>Tourism Component:</td>
<td>Improve facilities to create destination area, enhance tourism activity.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>1) $400,000 (60/40), Renewable Resource Agreement 1979-82; 2) $6.0 m. (85/15), 1980-82</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Figure 10: Montgomery (1980)*
Appendix G: RMI Formula (Pre-HST)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Accommodation Units</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Less than 450</td>
<td>1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>450 to 899</td>
<td>2%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>900 to 1349</td>
<td>3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1350 Accommodation Units or greater</td>
<td>4%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[
\text{(Previous calendar year MRDT revenues)} \\
\times \\
\text{(Percentage value based on accommodation units/2\%)} \\
= \text{RMI Funding Amount}
\]

*Figure 11: Retrieved from RuralBC website (2014)*
Appendix H: Changes to the Local Government Act Through Bill 41 - 2007

Bill 41 clarified the wording in the Local Government Act to remove any ambiguity. Below is the un-amended Local Government Act, section 11(2.1):

(2.1) Despite section 8, in the case of an area that is not a mountain resort improvement district, the minister may recommend to the Lieutenant Governor in Council incorporation of the residents of the area into a new mountain resort municipality if the minister is satisfied that a person has entered into an agreement with the government with respect to developing alpine ski lift operations, year-round recreational facilities and commercial overnight accommodation within the area. [emphasis added].

After the amendments, section 11(2.1) is changed and section (3.01) is added:

(2.1) Despite section 8, in the case of an area that is not a mountain resort improvement district, the minister may recommend to the Lieutenant Governor in Council incorporation of a new mountain resort municipality for the area, whether or not there are residents in the area at the time of the recommendation, if the minister is satisfied that a person has entered into an agreement with the government with respect to developing alpine ski lift operations, year-round recreational facilities and commercial overnight accommodation within the area. [emphasis added].

(3.01) On the recommendation of the minister under subsection (2.1), and whether or not there are residents in the area at the time of incorporation, the Lieutenant Governor in Council may, by letters patent, incorporate a new mountain resort municipality for the area, consisting of the members of the municipal council and the residents of the area, if any. [emphasis added].
Appendix I: British Columbia's Resort Governance Evolutionary Timeline

**Provincial Political Leadership**
- So-Cred 1952-72
- NDP 1972-75
- So-Cred 1975-91
- NDP 1991-01

**Other Provincial Resort Areas**
- Cypress Bowl Development 1964

**Provincial Resort Policies/Legislation**
- Instant Town Act 1965
- Silver Book 1974
- RMOW 1975
- Whistler Village Land Company 1976
- Resort Association 1979

**Whistler**
- Provincial Bailout of WVUC 1983

**Broader Events**
- Ski Development in the US
- Recreational Resources
- Commercial Alpine Ski Policy 1982
- MRDT 1987

**Broader Forces**
- Expo 1986

**Public Funding in Whistler**